UK Government to Abolish Police and Crime Commissioners by 2028
UK Government to Abolish Police and Crime Commissioners by 2028
The UK government has announced its intention to abolish the system of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales by 2028. The system, introduced in 2012 to enhance police accountability, has been criticized for low voter turnout and the politicization of policing. The powers held by PCCs are expected to be transferred to mayors, in a move the government suggests could save up to £100 million.
Context & What Changed
The role of Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) was established in 40 police force areas across England and Wales (excluding the City of London and Greater Manchester) by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, with the first elections held in November 2012 (source: parliament.uk). This reform, a flagship policy of the then-Coalition government, replaced the previous system of Police Authorities, which were committees composed primarily of local councillors and independent members. The stated objective was to enhance democratic accountability by creating a single, directly elected official responsible for the totality of policing in their area. The core functions of a PCC include setting the local police and crime plan, determining the force’s annual budget and council tax precept, appointing and, if necessary, dismissing the Chief Constable, and holding them to account for force performance (source: gov.uk).
From their inception, PCCs have been a subject of significant debate. Proponents argued they provided a clear line of accountability, a visible public face for policing governance, and a mandate to respond to local priorities. However, the model has faced persistent and substantial criticism on several fronts. Voter turnout at PCC elections has been chronically low, often failing to reach 30% and falling to 15.1% in the inaugural 2012 elections, undermining claims of a strong democratic mandate (source: The Electoral Commission). Critics also pointed to the politicization of policing, with candidates often running on party-political platforms, potentially compromising the operational independence of Chief Constables. Furthermore, the effectiveness and strategic capacity of individual PCCs have been highly variable, leading to questions about the consistency and quality of governance across the country.
The significant change announced by the government is the decision to legislate for the complete abolition of the PCC role by 2028. This represents a fundamental reversal of the 2012 reforms. The plan involves transferring the powers and responsibilities of PCCs to mayors, particularly in areas with Mayoral Combined Authorities (MCAs). This move aligns with a broader trend in English governance towards devolution and the consolidation of strategic functions under directly elected mayors. The stated rationale includes streamlining governance, improving the integration of policing with other local public services (such as transport, housing, and skills), and achieving financial savings estimated at approximately £100 million per annum.
Stakeholders
1. Central Government (Home Office): As the sponsoring department, the Home Office is the primary driver of this reform. It will be responsible for drafting and passing the necessary legislation, overseeing the transition, and establishing the new statutory framework for police governance. Its interest is in creating a more streamlined, cost-effective, and potentially more powerful lever for influencing regional governance.
2. Mayors and Mayoral Combined Authorities (MCAs): These are the principal beneficiaries of the reform, gaining significant new powers and budget oversight. This enhances their strategic role as leaders of their city-regions. Their key interest is in ensuring a smooth transfer of power and leveraging the new responsibilities to deliver more integrated public services.
3. Existing Police and Crime Commissioners: This group is being legislated out of existence. Their primary interest will be in managing the transition for their staff, ensuring continuity of police oversight until the role is abolished, and shaping the legacy of their work. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) will be a key lobbying voice during the legislative process.
4. Chief Constables and Police Forces: This reform directly changes their line of accountability. Their core interest is in maintaining operational independence while building effective working relationships with the new governing bodies (mayors). They will be concerned about the potential for increased political interference in operational matters and the risk of disruption during the transition.
5. Local Authorities (especially in non-mayoral areas): In regions without a directly elected mayor, the abolition of PCCs creates a governance vacuum. The leaders of county and district councils will be critical stakeholders in designing the replacement accountability structures, likely involving joint committees or other collaborative models. Their interest is in retaining local influence over policing priorities.
6. Police and Crime Panels: These bodies, composed mainly of local councillors, currently scrutinize the work of PCCs. Their role will need to be fundamentally redesigned to provide effective checks and balances on mayors who hold policing powers. Their interest lies in ensuring the new scrutiny function is well-resourced and has sufficient statutory power.
7. Public and Civil Society: The public’s interest is in effective, accountable, and responsive policing. The reform’s success will be judged on whether it improves or diminishes police performance and public confidence. Civil society groups will focus on ensuring the new model maintains transparency and robust accountability.
Evidence & Data
The case for abolishing PCCs rests on data related to their cost, democratic legitimacy, and the parallel rise of mayoral governance.
Electoral Turnout: The democratic mandate of PCCs has been consistently weak. Turnout in standalone PCC elections has been poor: 15.1% in 2012, 26.6% in 2016 (held alongside local elections), and 34.2% in 2021 (held alongside multiple elections postponed from 2020) (source: The Electoral Commission, parliament.uk). This compares unfavorably with turnout for general elections (67.3% in 2019) and even many local elections, fueling arguments that the public is not engaged with the role.
Financial Costs: The government’s claim of £100 million in savings is plausible when considering the direct operational costs of the 40 PCC offices. This includes the salaries of PCCs (ranging from £66,300 to £101,600 depending on the force size) and their deputies, plus the costs of their support staff, offices, and administration (source: gov.uk). The cost of holding standalone PCC elections across England and Wales is also significant, estimated at over £75 million in 2012 (source: BBC News analysis). Abolishing the roles and integrating their functions into existing mayoral structures would eliminate most of these direct overheads.
Budgetary Oversight: PCCs are responsible for overseeing police force budgets which collectively amount to over £17 billion for 2023/24 in England and Wales (source: Institute for Government). Transferring this financial authority represents a substantial consolidation of fiscal power at the regional level under mayors.
Growth of Devolution: The landscape of English governance has changed significantly since 2012. There are now 10 Mayoral Combined Authorities in England covering major urban areas like Greater Manchester, the West Midlands, and West Yorkshire. These mayors already hold significant powers over transport, housing, and skills. In Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, the mayor already exercises the functions of the PCC. The reform can be seen as a logical extension of this devolution model, standardizing the approach across other mayoral areas.
Scenarios (3) with probabilities
1. Streamlined Integration (Probability: 60%): In this scenario, the government successfully passes the required legislation by 2026. The transfer of powers to existing and newly created mayoralties proceeds according to the 2028 timeline. New scrutiny panels are established with clear terms of reference. In non-mayoral areas, a stable model based on local authority joint committees is implemented. The projected cost savings are largely realized, and policing becomes a more integrated part of regional public service strategy with minimal operational disruption. This represents the intended policy outcome.
2. Fragmented and Contested Transition (Probability: 30%): The legislative process is delayed by political opposition or significant amendments in the House of Lords. The primary challenge arises in designing a workable and democratically legitimate governance model for the non-metropolitan, two-tier council areas. This leads to a patchwork of different accountability structures across the country, creating inconsistency. The transition is marked by political disputes between county and district councils, and Chief Constables face unclear lines of accountability. Some projected savings are lost to complex new administrative arrangements and prolonged transition costs.
3. Policy Reversal or Dilution (Probability: 10%): A change in government before 2028, or a significant backlash from a coalition of rural councils and policing bodies, leads to a reversal or major dilution of the policy. The PCC role might be retained but with a modified remit, or a ‘PCC-lite’ model is adopted, negating the core objectives of streamlining and cost-saving. This would result in policy churn, institutional uncertainty for police forces, and wasted legislative and administrative effort.
Timelines
Q4 2025 – Q2 2026: Publication of a White Paper or detailed policy statement, followed by a period of consultation with stakeholders. Introduction of primary legislation to Parliament.
Q3 2026 – Q4 2027: Parliamentary passage of the Bill. Royal Assent is likely achieved by late 2027. During this period, the Home Office will work with mayoral authorities and local government to develop detailed transition plans and statutory instruments.
Q1 2028 – Q4 2028: The Act comes into force. A phased transfer of powers, budgets, and staff from PCC offices to the new governance bodies. The final PCCs leave office, and the system is formally abolished. New scrutiny panels become operational.
Post-2028: Bedding-in period for the new arrangements. The first few years will be critical for establishing effective working relationships between mayors and Chief Constables and for demonstrating the benefits of the new integrated model.
Quantified Ranges
Annual Cost Savings: The government’s £100 million figure is a central estimate. A reasonable range is £80 million to £120 million per annum. The lower end accounts for potential transition costs and the need to fund new, robust scrutiny functions within mayoral offices. The higher end could be achieved if significant back-office efficiencies are realized through full integration.
Affected Personnel: The number of staff directly employed in the 40 PCC offices (including chief executives, finance officers, and policy advisors) is estimated to be between 800 and 1,200. Their roles will be subject to transfer (under TUPE regulations) or redundancy.
Consolidated Budgetary Authority: Mayors in England will gain direct oversight of police budgets totaling over £12 billion (excluding Wales and existing mayoralties with police powers). This represents a major shift in sub-national public finance.
Risks & Mitigations
Risk 1: Democratic Deficit and Over-centralization: Concentrating policing power in a single mayoral figure who also holds sway over transport, housing, and economic development could reduce specific focus on policing and create an over-mighty executive, weakening accountability.
Mitigation: Legislate for the creation of mandatory, well-resourced, and statutorily independent scrutiny panels for each mayoral authority. These panels must have the power to summon the mayor, review documents, and publish their findings. Consider a ‘deputy mayor for policing’ model to ensure dedicated focus.
Risk 2: Governance Gap in Non-Mayoral Areas: The reform is straightforward in mayoral regions but complex elsewhere. A poorly designed replacement in shire counties could be less effective and less accountable than the PCC model.
Mitigation: The enabling legislation must provide a clear and robust default model for non-mayoral areas, likely a statutory joint committee of council leaders. This model must have a clear mandate, voting structure, and funding mechanism to prevent paralysis by local political disputes.
Risk 3: Politicization and Operational Interference: Mayors, as high-profile political figures, may be tempted to interfere in operational policing matters to secure political advantage. This could compromise the impartiality of law enforcement.
Mitigation: The legislation must strongly reaffirm the principle of operational independence for Chief Constables, as enshrined in the Police Act 1996. The Policing Protocol Order should be updated to clearly delineate the strategic role of the mayor from the operational command of the Chief Constable.
Risk 4: Transition and Implementation Failure: A rushed or poorly managed transition could disrupt policing strategy, budget cycles, and key partnerships, damaging force morale and performance.
Mitigation: Establish a dedicated, Home Office-led transition program with clear milestones and resources. Mandate joint transition teams in each area, comprising representatives from the outgoing PCC office, the incoming authority, and the police force, to ensure a smooth handover of responsibilities, assets, and contracts.
Sector/Region Impacts
Public Sector Governance: This reform significantly accelerates the trend of executive mayoral devolution in England. It strengthens the role of mayors as the primary strategic leaders for their regions, making the mayoralty a more powerful and attractive political office. It will force a re-evaluation of governance structures in non-devolved parts of England.
Policing and Criminal Justice: Police forces will need to adapt to a new accountability relationship. The change offers opportunities for better alignment of policing with other local services (e.g., mental health, youth services) to tackle the root causes of crime. However, it also creates the risk of policing priorities being subsumed by broader economic development agendas.
Regional Disparity: The reform will likely increase the governance gap between metropolitan areas with powerful mayors and non-metropolitan areas. The former will have a single figurehead able to integrate services and attract investment, while the latter may be left with more fragmented and complex arrangements.
Recommendations & Outlook
For Central Government: Focus urgently on designing a viable and democratically legitimate governance model for non-mayoral areas. This is the single biggest point of failure for the reform. The transition must be supported by adequate funding and expert guidance from the Home Office to avoid local implementation failures.
For Mayoral Combined Authorities: Begin immediate capacity planning. This includes designing the future scrutiny function, identifying the necessary policy and finance expertise to manage the policing portfolio, and initiating dialogue with Chief Constables to build trust and establish clear working protocols well ahead of the formal transfer of power.
For Corporate and Financial Sectors: The consolidation of power under mayors makes them an even more critical stakeholder for any large-scale investment or infrastructure project. Understanding their expanded remit, including public safety, will be essential for regional business planning and public-private partnerships.
Outlook: The abolition of PCCs is a logical, if politically bold, step in the evolution of English devolution. (Scenario-based assumption) If the transition is managed effectively, particularly in non-mayoral areas, the reform has the potential to create more coherent regional governance, better-integrated public services, and clearer strategic leadership. (Scenario-based assumption) The primary benefit lies in aligning policing strategy with wider determinants of crime and safety, such as housing, employment, and health, under a single accountable leader. However, (scenario-based assumption) the most significant risk is the potential for a democratic deficit, where robust scrutiny fails to keep pace with the concentration of executive power. The success of this major public administration reform will hinge entirely on the quality of the legislation and the detailed design of the accountability frameworks that replace the flawed but single-focus role of the PCC.