Polls open in Myanmar as military holds first election since 2021 coup

Polls open in Myanmar as military holds first election since 2021 coup

The military junta in Myanmar has commenced its first election since seizing power in a 2021 coup. The electoral process is widely criticized by the United Nations, human rights organizations, and opposition parties, who assert it is neither free, fair, nor credible. This election takes place amidst an ongoing civil war and a 'climate of fear' reported by observers.

Context & What Changed

Myanmar has been in a state of profound political and humanitarian crisis since the military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized power on February 1, 2021, overthrowing the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) (source: un.org). The coup plunged the country into widespread civil disobedience, protests, and eventually, an armed conflict that has escalated into a civil war (source: amnesty.org). The military junta, officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC), justified the coup by alleging widespread fraud in the November 2020 general election, despite independent election observers finding no evidence to support these claims (source: reuters.com). The NLD had won a landslide victory in that election.

In response to the coup, a broad-based opposition movement emerged, including the formation of the National Unity Government (NUG), comprising elected parliamentarians, ethnic minority representatives, and civil society leaders (source: nugofficial.org). The NUG declared the SAC illegitimate and established the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) to resist military rule, often collaborating with long-standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) (source: irrawaddy.com). This has led to widespread armed conflict across much of the country, displacing millions and causing a severe humanitarian crisis (source: ocha.un.org).

What changed with the opening of polls is the military's overt attempt to formalize and legitimize its rule through an electoral process, nearly four years after the coup. This election is the first significant electoral exercise conducted by the SAC since taking power. The move is widely seen by the international community, human rights groups, and the domestic opposition as a sham designed to create a veneer of democratic legitimacy for the junta, rather than genuinely reflecting the will of the people (source: aljazeera.com). The NLD has been largely dismantled, its leaders imprisoned or in exile, and many opposition figures have been barred from participating or are in hiding (source: hrw.org). The election is being held under conditions of severe repression, ongoing conflict, and a lack of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of assembly and expression, which are prerequisites for any credible election (source: un.org/myanmar).

Stakeholders

1. Myanmar Military (Tatmadaw/SAC): The primary actor, seeking to consolidate its power and gain domestic and international legitimacy through the election. Its objective is to establish a political system it can control, marginalizing democratic forces and suppressing armed resistance. The military benefits from continued control over key economic sectors and natural resources (source: un.org/myanmar).

2. National Unity Government (NUG) and People's Defense Forces (PDFs): The main opposition to the SAC, representing the democratically elected government. They reject the election as illegitimate and continue to advocate for a federal democracy and the restoration of civilian rule. Their influence relies on international recognition and their ability to sustain armed resistance and civil disobedience (source: nugofficial.org).

3. Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs): Diverse groups with varying degrees of autonomy and objectives. Some EAOs are allied with the NUG/PDFs, while others maintain a more neutral stance or have reached ceasefires with the Tatmadaw. Their participation or non-participation in the electoral process, and their ongoing military actions, significantly impact the conflict's dynamics and regional stability (source: usip.org).

4. Myanmar Population: The civilian population bears the brunt of the conflict, displacement, and repression. Their interests lie in peace, stability, human rights, and democratic governance. Many are forced to choose between participating in a perceived illegitimate election under duress or facing potential repercussions from the junta (source: hrw.org).

5. United Nations (UN): Advocates for human rights, humanitarian aid, and a peaceful, democratic resolution to the crisis. The UN has consistently condemned the coup and called for the restoration of democracy (source: un.org). It plays a crucial role in monitoring the humanitarian situation and coordinating international responses.

6. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): A regional bloc that has attempted to mediate the crisis through its 'Five-Point Consensus' (source: asean.org). However, ASEAN's efforts have been largely ineffective due to internal divisions and the SAC's non-compliance. The election poses a challenge to ASEAN's credibility and its principle of non-interference.

7. China: Myanmar's largest neighbor and a significant economic and strategic partner. China's primary interests are border stability, protection of its investments (e.g., Belt and Road Initiative projects), and access to natural resources (source: cfr.org). China has generally avoided strong condemnation of the junta and maintains engagement, seeking to protect its interests amidst the instability.

8. United States (US) and European Union (EU): Leading proponents of democracy and human rights, they have imposed targeted sanctions on the SAC, its members, and associated entities (source: state.gov, ec.europa.eu). They reject the legitimacy of the election and support the NUG, advocating for a return to democratic rule and accountability for human rights abuses.

9. India: Shares a long border with Myanmar and has strategic interests in regional stability and counter-insurgency efforts (source: mea.gov.in). India's approach balances democratic principles with pragmatic security and economic concerns, often engaging with the junta while expressing concerns about the humanitarian situation.

10. International NGOs and Aid Agencies: Provide critical humanitarian assistance to the displaced and affected populations. They face significant challenges in access and security due to the ongoing conflict and restrictions imposed by the junta (source: doctorswithoutborders.org).

Evidence & Data

The claim that the election is not free, fair, or credible is supported by a substantial body of evidence and statements from reputable international bodies and human rights organizations:

UN Statements: The United Nations Secretary-General and the UN Human Rights Office have repeatedly stated that any elections held under the current military regime cannot be considered free or fair due given the widespread human rights abuses, suppression of dissent, and lack of a conducive environment for genuine political participation (source: un.org/myanmar, ohchr.org).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International Reports: These organizations have documented extensive human rights violations by the Tatmadaw since the coup, including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, and attacks on civilians (source: hrw.org, amnesty.org). They highlight that such an environment is antithetical to credible elections.

Opposition Parties' Stance: The National League for Democracy (NLD), the party that won the 2020 election, has been effectively outlawed or severely restricted, with many of its leaders imprisoned or facing charges (source: reuters.com). The NUG and other democratic forces have explicitly called for a boycott of the election, deeming it a fraudulent attempt to legitimize military rule (source: nugofficial.org).

Lack of Independent Observation: There is a notable absence of credible international election observers, a standard requirement for verifying electoral integrity. The junta has restricted access for independent media and international bodies, making transparent monitoring impossible (source: aljazeera.com).

Pre-election Crackdowns: Reports indicate increased military operations in areas controlled by resistance forces, voter intimidation, and restrictions on political assembly and speech leading up to the polls (source: bbc.com, irrawaddy.com). The electoral law itself has been criticized for imposing stringent requirements that effectively exclude opposition parties and candidates (source: asia.nikkei.com).

Displacement and Conflict: The ongoing civil war has led to the displacement of over 2.5 million people (source: ocha.un.org). A significant portion of the population is unable to vote safely or freely, particularly in conflict-affected areas, further undermining the inclusivity and legitimacy of the election.

Media Censorship: Independent media outlets have been shut down or forced underground, and access to information is heavily controlled by the junta, preventing informed public discourse essential for a democratic election (source: cpj.org).

Scenarios (3) with Probabilities

Scenario 1: Junta Consolidates Power with Superficial Legitimacy (Probability: 60%)

Description: The election proceeds as planned, with the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) or allied parties declared the overwhelming winners. The SAC uses the election results to claim a popular mandate, both domestically and internationally. International condemnation continues, but coordinated action remains limited due to geopolitical divisions (e.g., China and Russia's continued engagement). The civil war persists, but the junta focuses on containing resistance rather than seeking genuine political dialogue. Some regional actors might grudgingly acknowledge the new 'government' for pragmatic reasons.

Implications: Policy decisions will continue to be dictated by the military, with minimal civilian oversight. Infrastructure development will be limited to projects serving military or strategic economic interests, often with Chinese backing. Regulation will remain arbitrary and serve the junta's agenda, stifling foreign investment outside of protected sectors. Public finance will be dominated by military spending and illicit revenue streams, with limited transparency or accountability. Large-cap industry actors will face continued high political risk, potential sanctions, and operational challenges, leading to further divestment or highly selective, risk-tolerant engagement.

Scenario 2: Increased International Pressure and Sanctions (Probability: 25%)

Description: The international community, particularly Western nations and some ASEAN members, widely rejects the election as illegitimate. This leads to a more robust and coordinated international response, including expanded targeted sanctions against the SAC, its economic interests, and key individuals. Diplomatic efforts intensify to isolate the junta and provide greater support to the NUG and humanitarian initiatives. The increased pressure could strain the junta's resources and potentially lead to internal divisions or a greater willingness to engage in dialogue, albeit reluctantly.

Implications: Policy will be heavily influenced by external pressures, potentially leading to some concessions or a more defensive posture from the junta. Infrastructure projects, especially those requiring international financing or expertise, will face significant hurdles. Regulation will become even more complex for foreign entities due to sanctions compliance. Public finance will be severely constrained by reduced foreign investment, aid, and trade, potentially exacerbating economic hardship for the population. Large-cap industry actors will face heightened compliance risks and reputational damage, making operations in Myanmar increasingly untenable for many.

Scenario 3: Escalation of Civil Conflict and Regional Instability (Probability: 15%)

Description: The election is perceived by the NUG, PDFs, and EAOs as a definitive rejection of their demands for democracy, leading to a significant intensification of armed resistance. The conflict spreads to new areas, and existing front lines become more volatile. This could lead to a further breakdown of state control, increased humanitarian suffering, and a surge in refugees spilling into neighboring countries, particularly Thailand, India, and China. Regional stability is severely threatened, potentially drawing in external actors or leading to cross-border incidents.

Implications: Policy will be entirely dominated by conflict management and humanitarian response. Infrastructure will suffer extensive damage, with no new development possible. Regulation will be non-existent in many areas, leading to lawlessness and increased illicit activities. Public finance will collapse, relying almost entirely on emergency aid and black market revenues. Large-cap industry actors will face extreme operational risks, forced closures, and complete withdrawal, as the security situation becomes unmanageable. This scenario poses the greatest risk of a failed state and prolonged regional crisis.

Timelines

Immediate (0-3 months post-election):

Political: Official announcement of election results. International condemnation and non-recognition by many Western states and the NUG. Potential for increased military crackdowns on dissent. NUG and EAOs may intensify resistance operations in response.

Humanitarian: Possible surge in internal displacement and refugee flows to neighboring countries, especially if conflict intensifies. Increased demand for humanitarian aid.

Economic: Continued economic stagnation. Limited new foreign direct investment (FDI). Possible additional targeted sanctions.

Short-term (3-12 months post-election):

Political: Entrenchment of the junta's 'new' government structure. Continued civil war with shifting front lines. ASEAN's internal debate on engagement with Myanmar intensifies.

Humanitarian: Protracted humanitarian crisis, with challenges in aid delivery. Risk of famine and disease in conflict zones.

Economic: Further deterioration of the formal economy. Growth of informal and illicit economies. Continued brain drain.

Medium-term (1-3 years post-election):

Political: Long-term political stalemate or slow, grinding conflict. Potential for new diplomatic initiatives, possibly led by regional powers like China, if instability threatens their interests.

Humanitarian: Deepening of the humanitarian crisis, requiring sustained international support. Risk of regional destabilization due to refugee burden and cross-border issues.

Economic: Potential for Myanmar to become a pariah state, with limited integration into the global economy. Continued reliance on a few key trading partners (e.g., China, Thailand) and resource extraction. Significant challenges for any future reconstruction efforts.

Quantified Ranges

Specific quantified ranges directly tied to the immediate impact of this election are difficult to provide due to the opacity of the junta's governance and the ongoing conflict. However, existing data provides context:

Displaced Persons: Over 2.5 million people have been internally displaced since the 2021 coup (source: ocha.un.org). This number is likely to increase with any escalation of conflict post-election.

Humanitarian Needs: An estimated 18.6 million people (about one-third of the population) require humanitarian assistance (source: ocha.un.org). The election is unlikely to alleviate these needs and may exacerbate them.

Economic Contraction: Myanmar's economy contracted by approximately 18% in 2021 following the coup (source: worldbank.org). While there has been some stabilization, growth remains far below pre-coup levels, and the election is not expected to attract significant new legitimate investment.

FDI Decline: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows have significantly declined since the coup, with many Western companies divesting (source: reuters.com, author's assumption based on general reporting). The election is unlikely to reverse this trend and may accelerate it for ethical investors.

Refugee Flows: Tens of thousands of Myanmar refugees have fled to neighboring countries, particularly Thailand and India, since the coup (source: unhcr.org). An intensified conflict could lead to further significant outflows.

Risks & Mitigations

Risks:

1. Prolonged and Intensified Civil Conflict: The election, perceived as illegitimate, could further galvanize resistance, leading to increased fighting, civilian casualties, and destruction of infrastructure. (source: hrw.org)
2. Deepening Humanitarian Crisis: Escalation of conflict and continued military repression will exacerbate displacement, food insecurity, and health crises, overwhelming aid efforts. (source: ocha.un.org)
3. Regional Instability: Increased refugee flows, cross-border incursions, and illicit trade (drugs, arms) could destabilize neighboring countries, particularly Thailand, India, and China. (source: unodc.org, author’s assumption)
4. Economic Collapse and Illicit Economies: Continued international isolation and internal conflict will cripple the formal economy, leading to widespread poverty and a greater reliance on illicit activities, including narcotics and illegal resource extraction. (source: unodc.org)
5. Erosion of International Norms: The successful entrenchment of a military regime through a fraudulent election could weaken international norms around democracy and human rights, potentially emboldening other authoritarian regimes. (source: un.org)
6. Loss of Human Capital: Continued conflict and repression will accelerate the brain drain, as educated and skilled individuals seek opportunities and safety abroad, hindering any future recovery. (source: imf.org, author’s assumption)

Mitigations:

1. Coordinated International Diplomatic Pressure: UN Security Council members and ASEAN must work towards a unified and robust response, including clear rejection of the election’s legitimacy and sustained calls for dialogue. (source: un.org)
2. Targeted Sanctions: Expand and enforce targeted sanctions against the SAC, its leadership, military-owned enterprises, and sources of revenue, while minimizing harm to the civilian population. (source: state.gov, ec.europa.eu)
3. Increased Humanitarian Aid and Access: Advocate for unimpeded humanitarian access to all affected areas and significantly increase funding for aid organizations operating in Myanmar and neighboring countries. (source: ocha.un.org)
4. Support for Democratic Forces: Provide non-lethal support, technical assistance, and political recognition to the NUG and other legitimate democratic actors, bolstering their capacity to advocate for a democratic future. (source: author’s assumption based on general policy recommendations)
5. Regional Engagement: ASEAN needs to move beyond the Five-Point Consensus’s limitations and develop a more effective strategy, potentially involving greater engagement with the NUG and stronger pressure on the SAC. (source: asean.org, author’s assumption)
6. Documentation and Accountability: Continue to document human rights abuses and violations of international law to ensure future accountability and deter further atrocities. (source: ohchr.org)

Sector/Region Impacts

Sector Impacts:

Infrastructure Delivery: Severely hampered. Ongoing conflict leads to damage to existing infrastructure (roads, bridges, utilities). Lack of security, funding, and international partners means new large-scale infrastructure projects are virtually impossible outside of strategic military or Chinese-backed initiatives. Prioritization shifts from public utility to military logistics. (source: worldbank.org, author's assumption)

Public Finance: Deeply distressed. The junta's budget is heavily skewed towards military spending. Revenue collection is weak, and international aid for development has largely ceased. The country relies on resource extraction (gas, timber, gems) and illicit trade for revenue, leading to a shadow economy. Debt sustainability is a major concern. (source: imf.org, author's assumption)

Regulation: Highly arbitrary and politicized. Rule of law is severely eroded, making regulatory compliance unpredictable and risky for businesses. Regulations are often used to suppress dissent or benefit military-linked entities. This creates an unfavorable environment for legitimate investment. (source: hrw.org, author's assumption)

Large-Cap Industry Actors:

Energy & Mining: Companies in these sectors (e.g., oil and gas, precious metals) face immense ethical and operational challenges. Many Western firms have divested, while others (particularly from China, Thailand) continue to operate, navigating complex political risks and potential sanctions. (source: reuters.com, author's assumption)

Manufacturing & Garment: Foreign investment has largely withdrawn or scaled back due to sanctions, supply chain disruptions, and reputational risks. Local industries struggle with labor shortages, power outages, and insecurity. (source: author's assumption based on industry reports)

Telecommunications: Companies face pressure to comply with junta surveillance demands, raising human rights concerns. Some international players have exited. (source: hrw.org, author's assumption)

Financial Services: Heavily impacted by sanctions, capital controls, and a lack of trust. International banking relationships are severed or severely restricted. (source: author's assumption)

Region Impacts:

ASEAN: The crisis in Myanmar continues to be a major challenge to ASEAN's unity and credibility. The influx of refugees strains resources in border states (Thailand). The failure of the Five-Point Consensus undermines ASEAN's ability to manage regional crises. The election further complicates diplomatic engagement. (source: asean.org)

China: Maintains significant economic and strategic interests in Myanmar, including energy pipelines and Belt and Road Initiative projects. China prioritizes border stability and protecting its investments. The election's outcome will influence China's engagement strategy, potentially leading to increased support for the junta to ensure stability on its border. (source: cfr.org)

India: Shares a porous border and has concerns about security, cross-border insurgency, and refugee flows. India balances its strategic interests with democratic values. The election's outcome will necessitate a careful diplomatic approach to manage border security and humanitarian concerns. (source: mea.gov.in)

Thailand: Bears a significant burden of refugees and displaced persons from Myanmar. Border trade and security are major concerns. Thailand's policy will likely continue to balance humanitarian concerns with pragmatic engagement to manage border issues. (source: unhcr.org, author's assumption)

Recommendations & Outlook

For governments, international organizations, and large-cap industry actors, the following recommendations are critical in navigating the complex and volatile situation in Myanmar:

For Governments and International Organizations:

1. Maintain a Unified Stance on Election Illegitimacy: Publicly and consistently reject the legitimacy of the military’s election. This is crucial for upholding international democratic norms and preventing the junta from gaining undue recognition (scenario-based assumption: this will reinforce international pressure and support for democratic forces).
2. Strengthen and Coordinate Targeted Sanctions: Expand sanctions to further isolate the SAC and its financial networks, ensuring they are designed to minimize harm to the civilian population. Coordinate efforts with allies to maximize impact (scenario-based assumption: this will increase economic pressure on the junta, potentially limiting its capacity to wage war).
3. Increase Humanitarian Aid and Advocate for Access: Prioritize and significantly increase funding for humanitarian assistance. Exert diplomatic pressure to ensure unimpeded access for aid organizations to all populations in need, including those in conflict zones (scenario-based assumption: this will mitigate the severe humanitarian crisis and save lives, regardless of the political outcome).
4. Support Democratic Alternatives: Continue to recognize and engage with the National Unity Government (NUG) and other legitimate democratic actors. Provide technical and political support to help them build capacity for future governance (scenario-based assumption: this will keep the prospect of a democratic future alive and provide a credible alternative to military rule).
5. Engage Regional Partners: Work with ASEAN and other regional actors to develop a more effective and unified strategy for Myanmar, emphasizing dialogue, human rights, and stability (scenario-based assumption: this could lead to more coordinated regional pressure, which is vital given the limitations of external intervention).

For Large-Cap Industry Actors:

1. Conduct Rigorous Due Diligence and Risk Assessment: Companies with existing or potential ties to Myanmar must conduct thorough human rights and political risk due diligence. Assess the ethical implications and compliance risks, including sanctions, associated with any operations (scenario-based assumption: this will protect against reputational damage, legal penalties, and financial losses).
2. Prioritize Responsible Disengagement or Ethical Operations: For those unable to meet stringent ethical and compliance standards, responsible disengagement may be the most prudent course. For those remaining, ensure operations strictly adhere to international human rights standards and avoid any direct or indirect support to the junta (scenario-based assumption: this will align operations with corporate social responsibility principles and mitigate long-term risks).
3. Monitor Geopolitical Developments Closely: The situation is highly fluid. Companies must continuously monitor political developments, sanctions regimes, and security conditions to adapt strategies accordingly (scenario-based assumption: this will enable agile responses to changes in the operating environment).
4. Support Local Communities and Humanitarian Efforts: Where possible and appropriate, support local communities through humanitarian initiatives, ensuring aid does not inadvertently benefit the military regime (scenario-based assumption: this can help maintain a positive local presence and contribute to long-term stability).

Outlook:

The immediate outlook for Myanmar is one of continued political instability, humanitarian suffering, and economic stagnation (scenario-based assumption). The military's election is unlikely to bring genuine peace or legitimacy and will likely deepen the country's divisions. The international community faces a critical juncture: either accept the junta's manufactured legitimacy, thereby undermining democratic norms, or intensify efforts to isolate the regime and support the democratic movement (scenario-based assumption). The path forward is fraught with challenges, and a swift resolution to the crisis is improbable. Long-term stability and democratic transition will require sustained, coordinated international pressure, coupled with robust support for the people of Myanmar and their legitimate representatives (scenario-based assumption).