Police and crime commissioners to be abolished, government to announce

Police and crime commissioners to be abolished, government to announce

The UK government is set to abolish the system of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) across England and Wales. The system, which was introduced in 2012 to increase police accountability, has faced criticism regarding low voter engagement and the politicization of policing. The government claims the move will save £100 million over the course of the current Parliament.

Context & What Changed

The announced abolition of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in England and Wales represents a fundamental reversal of a major public administration reform initiated just over a decade ago. The PCC model was established by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and implemented in 2012 by the then-Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. It replaced the system of Police Authorities, which were committees typically composed of local councillors and independent members. The stated primary objective for creating PCCs was to enhance democratic accountability by replacing these indirect bodies with a single, directly elected individual for each of the 41 police force areas outside of London. These individuals were tasked with setting the strategic direction and budget for their respective police force, appointing and, if necessary, dismissing the Chief Constable, and holding the force to account on behalf of the public (source: Institute for Government).

From their inception, PCCs have been a subject of debate. Proponents argued they provided a clear line of accountability and a visible public figurehead for policing governance. However, the model has faced persistent criticism on several fronts. Voter turnout for PCC elections has been chronically low; the inaugural 2012 elections saw an average turnout of just 15.1% (source: The Electoral Commission), and while this has improved when held concurrently with other elections (reaching 34.2% in 2021), it remains far below general election levels. This has consistently undermined the democratic mandate of the officeholders. Furthermore, critics have pointed to the politicization of policing, with PCCs often elected on a party-political platform, leading to potential conflicts with operationally independent Chief Constables. The effectiveness and consistency of PCCs have also been questioned, with performance varying significantly between force areas.

The change announced by the government is the complete abolition of this system. This decision signals a governmental conclusion that the decade-long experiment has failed to meet its objectives or that its costs and disadvantages now outweigh its benefits. The government's stated rationale focuses on cost savings—a projected £100 million over a five-year parliamentary term—and low public awareness, with one report suggesting that less than 20% of voters can name their PCC (source: The Guardian). The abolition necessitates the creation of a new governance framework for policing, marking a significant pivot in public policy.

Stakeholders

UK Government (Home Office): As the primary driver, the government seeks to deliver on perceived efficiency gains and address the model's perceived failings. The move centralizes policy direction, though the replacement structure's design will determine the final balance of power between central and local authorities. The Home Office will be responsible for designing and legislating for the new framework.

Police Forces and Chief Constables: The relationship between Chief Constables and PCCs has often been fraught. Some chiefs will welcome the removal of what they may see as a layer of political interference, potentially strengthening their operational autonomy. Others who have forged effective partnerships with their PCCs may fear the uncertainty of a new system and the potential for a different, perhaps more bureaucratic, form of oversight.

Local Government: Local authorities and combined authority mayors are key stakeholders. The abolition could see policing governance powers revert to them, aligning with the broader devolution agenda in England. Mayors in metropolitan areas like Greater Manchester, who have already absorbed PCC functions, provide a potential model. For other councils, this could mean reconstituting police and crime panels with enhanced powers, increasing their influence but also their administrative responsibilities.

Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs): The 41 incumbent PCCs, their deputies, and their office staff are directly and negatively impacted. They represent a body of elected officials who will argue for the model's successes in connecting policing to the public and will likely form a vocal opposition to the proposed changes.

The Public: The ultimate stakeholder, for whom the system of accountability is designed. While low turnout indicates widespread disengagement with the PCC model, the removal of any directly elected oversight role is a significant change. The impact on public trust, police priorities, and the effectiveness of local policing will be the ultimate measure of the reform's success or failure.

Political Parties: The PCC system was a flagship policy of the 2010-2015 Conservative-led government. Its abolition by a subsequent government represents a notable policy reversal, reflecting a shift in thinking on public service governance. Opposition parties will scrutinize the replacement model for its democratic legitimacy and potential for centralisation.

Evidence & Data

The case for abolishing PCCs rests on evidence related to cost, democratic legitimacy, and public awareness.

Financials: The government's headline saving of £100 million over a Parliament equates to £20 million per year. The total gross revenue expenditure for policing in England and Wales in 2023-24 was budgeted at £17.2 billion (source: gov.uk). The projected saving therefore represents approximately 0.12% of the total annual policing budget. While not insignificant, it is a marginal sum in the context of overall police funding, suggesting that cost is a supporting justification rather than the primary driver for such a major structural reform.

Democratic Mandate: The consistently low voter turnout is the strongest evidence against the PCC model. The 15.1% turnout in 2012 was a historical low for a peacetime national election in the UK. Even in 2021, when held alongside local elections, the 34.2% average turnout was significantly lower than the 67.3% turnout for the 2019 UK General Election (source: The Electoral Commission). This data supports the argument that the model has failed to capture public interest and establish a strong democratic mandate.

Public Awareness: The claim that fewer than 20% of voters can name their PCC is a powerful indicator of the model's low public profile. While specific polling fluctuates, surveys have consistently shown low name recognition. For example, a 2018 YouGov poll found that only 28% of people in England and Wales knew that PCCs existed, let alone could name their representative (source: YouGov). This lack of awareness undermines the core concept of a visible, accountable figurehead.

Performance: Assessing the direct impact of PCCs on policing performance is challenging due to multiple influencing factors. However, reports from His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) have provided mixed reviews. While some PCCs have been praised for effective strategic planning and victim support services, HMICFRS has also highlighted inconsistencies and, in some cases, a lack of effective scrutiny of force performance. There is no conclusive national data proving the PCC model has been more effective than the Police Authorities it replaced.

Scenarios (3) with probabilities

Scenario 1: A Hybrid Devolution Model (High Probability: 60%)

In this scenario, policing governance is integrated into existing devolution structures where possible. In metropolitan regions with combined authority mayors (e.g., Greater Manchester, West Midlands), the mayor formally assumes all powers of the PCC, simplifying the local governance landscape. In areas without such structures (e.g., shire counties), powers revert to a reconstituted ‘Police and Crime Panel’ or similar board, likely dominated by local authority leaders and councillors, with some independent members. This approach aligns with the current direction of English devolution and offers a bespoke solution for different local contexts.

Scenario 2: Return to a 'Police Authority Plus' Model (Medium Probability: 30%)

This scenario involves a nationwide return to a committee-based system, reminiscent of the pre-2012 Police Authorities but reformed to address past criticisms. The new bodies would be composed of local councillors and independent appointees, but with a more robust mandate, greater transparency requirements, and perhaps a directly appointed chair. This would be a less radical change than full devolution and would provide a uniform governance model across the country, which may be administratively simpler for the Home Office to manage.

Scenario 3: Enhanced Central Control (Low Probability: 10%)

In this less likely scenario, the abolition of PCCs is used as an opportunity to significantly increase central control over policing. The Home Office would assume greater responsibility for setting national standards and strategic direction, with Chief Constables becoming more directly accountable to the Home Secretary. Local scrutiny would be relegated to a purely advisory role. This would be a highly controversial move, likely to be attacked as a power grab that undermines the principle of policing by consent and local accountability. Given the strong political pushback this would generate, it remains an outlier possibility.

Timelines

Phase 1: Legislation & Transition (0-18 months): Following the formal announcement, the government would likely publish a white paper detailing the proposed new framework, followed by a consultation period. A bill would then be introduced in Parliament. This legislative process could take 12-18 months. During this time, incumbent PCCs would continue in their roles, but under a cloud of uncertainty, potentially impacting long-term strategic planning.

Phase 2: Implementation (18-30 months): Once the legislation receives Royal Assent, a phased implementation would begin. This would involve the formal winding down of PCC offices and the establishment of the new governance bodies. The next scheduled PCC elections (likely May 2028, based on a 2025 announcement) would be cancelled. Transitional arrangements would be critical to ensure no governance vacuum emerges.

Phase 3: Bedding-In (30-60 months): The new system would become fully operational across all police force areas. The initial years would be a period of adjustment as new relationships are formed between police leadership and the new oversight bodies. The projected financial savings would start to be fully realized during this period, and the first formal reviews of the new system's effectiveness would likely be commissioned.

Quantified Ranges

Direct Cost Savings: The government's projection of £100 million over a five-year Parliament is the central estimate. A plausible range is £80 million to £120 million. This is derived from the salaries of 41 PCCs (ranging from £66,300 to £101,400, source: gov.uk), their deputies, and the running costs of their private offices, offset by the administrative costs of the new system.

Transitional Costs: The process of abolition and replacement will incur one-off costs. These include staff redundancies, legal and administrative costs for establishing new bodies, and potential consultancy fees. A reasonable estimate for these one-off costs is £15 million to £30 million (author's assumption, based on precedent from other public sector reorganizations). These costs would significantly reduce the net savings in the first one to two years of the reform.

Budgetary Impact: The net annual saving, after accounting for the running costs of a new system, is likely to be in the range of £15 million to £20 million. This represents 0.09% to 0.12% of the total annual police budget, confirming its marginality relative to overall expenditure.

Risks & Mitigations

Risk 1: Accountability Gap: The most significant risk is that the new system provides weaker or more diffuse accountability than the PCC model, flawed as it was. A committee-based system can lead to unclear decision-making and a lack of a single point of contact for the public.

Mitigation: The new legislation must establish clear roles, responsibilities, and powers for the new governance bodies. Meetings should be held in public, with minutes and decisions easily accessible. A named individual, such as the committee chair or a lead mayor, should be designated as the primary public point of contact.

Risk 2: Increased Politicization: Reverting powers to local councils or mayors could entangle policing in local party politics to an even greater degree. Budgeting and priority-setting could become bargaining chips in council negotiations.

Mitigation: The statutory operational independence of Chief Constables must be robustly protected and reaffirmed in the new legislation. Furthermore, new governance bodies should be required to include independent members, appointed through a transparent process, to provide non-partisan expertise and challenge.

Risk 3: Implementation Failure: A poorly managed transition could disrupt policing strategy, create a leadership vacuum, and damage morale within police forces. The process of winding down 41 separate offices and establishing new bodies is administratively complex.

Mitigation: The Home Office must develop and fund a clear, detailed, and centrally managed implementation plan. This should include a 'shadow' period where new bodies can form and prepare before formally taking power, ensuring a seamless handover of responsibilities.

Sector/Region Impacts

Public Administration: This is a landmark reform, demonstrating that large-scale governance models introduced with significant political capital can be dismantled. It may embolden policymakers to review other quasi-autonomous bodies or elected positions created in recent decades. It signals a potential shift away from the 'new public management' trend of creating single, accountable leaders towards more integrated or committee-based governance.

Policing Sector: The reform will create a period of significant uncertainty for police leadership. Chief Constables will need to adapt to a new oversight structure, which will vary across the country. National policing bodies, like the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs' Council, will need to engage with a more diverse set of governance partners.

Regional Impact: The impact will be uneven. Metropolitan areas with mayors may experience a relatively seamless integration of powers, potentially leading to better-coordinated public services (e.g., aligning policing with transport and housing). Rural and non-metropolitan counties will face the greater challenge of creating effective and well-resourced new governance panels from scratch, with a risk of inconsistent performance across regions.

Recommendations & Outlook

For Government Agencies (Home Office, Treasury): (Scenario-based assumption: The government will proceed with abolition as announced). It is imperative to immediately establish a cross-departmental task force to manage the transition. A detailed white paper with a clear legislative timetable and a fully-costed implementation plan is the first priority. Consultation with police leaders and local government must be substantive, not perfunctory, to ensure the new model is workable.

For Police Leadership (Chief Constables, NPCC): Proactively engage in the consultation process to champion the principle of operational independence and advocate for a clear, stable, and well-resourced governance model. Begin scenario planning for how strategic priorities and budget allocations might change under different replacement models.

For Local Government Leaders: Assess the capacity and capability within local and combined authorities to take on policing governance. Leaders in mayoral authorities should review the successes and challenges from the Greater Manchester model. Leaders elsewhere should begin discussions on the optimal structure for regional police and crime panels.

Outlook: (Scenario-based assumption: The abolition will proceed, and a hybrid devolution model will be the chosen replacement). The end of the PCC experiment is driven by a clear failure to build democratic legitimacy. The success of the subsequent reform will hinge on whether the replacement can provide effective scrutiny and strategic direction without becoming either an invisible bureaucratic committee or an overly politicized council chamber. The marginal financial savings should be treated as a secondary benefit; the primary goal must be to create a durable, respected, and effective system of governance for one of the state's most critical public services. (Scenario-based assumption: We anticipate significant transitional challenges, and the new system will likely take a full parliamentary term to mature and demonstrate its value relative to the outgoing PCC model).