Britain caught in ‘space between peace and war’, new head of MI6 warns

Britain caught in ‘space between peace and war’, new head of MI6 warns

The new head of MI6, Blaise Metreweli, has issued a stark warning that Britain is operating in a precarious 'space between peace and war'. Metreweli emphasized that the global landscape is 'more dangerous and contested now than for decades'. This heightened complexity is significantly influenced by the rapid emergence and proliferation of artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies, which are increasingly dominated by powerful state and non-state actors (source: theguardian.com).

## Analysis: Navigating the 'Space Between Peace and War'

Context & What Changed

The recent declaration by Blaise Metreweli, the new head of MI6, that Britain is operating in a 'space between peace and war' signifies a profound shift in the strategic calculus for the United Kingdom and its allies. Historically, international relations were often conceptualized within a clear binary: either a state of peace, characterized by diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation, or a state of war, involving overt military conflict. Metreweli's statement fundamentally challenges this traditional dichotomy, asserting that the current global environment is characterized by persistent, multi-faceted competition and confrontation that falls short of conventional warfare but is far from genuine peace (source: theguardian.com). This 'grey zone' or 'hybrid warfare' concept is not entirely new, having been discussed in security circles for over a decade, but its formal articulation by the head of a major intelligence agency underscores its mainstream acceptance as the prevailing reality. What has changed is the intensity, pervasiveness, and technological sophistication of this 'space'. The warning highlights the accelerating role of artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, such as advanced cyber capabilities, quantum computing, and biotechnologies, in shaping this contested landscape. These technologies enable state and non-state actors to exert influence, disrupt critical infrastructure, conduct espionage, and spread disinformation with unprecedented scale, speed, and deniability. The dominance of these technologies by a limited number of powerful entities further complicates the strategic environment, creating new vectors for competition and potential conflict without necessarily crossing the threshold of conventional armed aggression (source: theguardian.com). This new reality demands a comprehensive re-evaluation of national security strategies, defense postures, economic resilience, and societal preparedness, moving beyond a reactive stance to one of continuous, proactive engagement in this perpetual state of strategic competition. The implications extend across all facets of governance, public finance, infrastructure, and large-cap industry operations, requiring an integrated national response.

Stakeholders

This strategic assessment impacts a broad array of stakeholders, both within the United Kingdom and internationally:

UK Government & Parliament: Responsible for defining national security policy, allocating defense and intelligence budgets, enacting legislation related to cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, and coordinating inter-agency responses. This includes the Prime Minister's Office, the Treasury, Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), Home Office, and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).

Intelligence & Security Agencies (MI6, MI5, GCHQ): Directly responsible for understanding, countering, and adapting to threats in this 'grey zone'. Their operational mandates, resource requirements, and strategic priorities will be profoundly shaped by this assessment.

Armed Forces: The Royal Navy, British Army, and Royal Air Force must adapt their doctrines, training, and procurement to address hybrid threats, including cyber warfare, information operations, and proxy conflicts, alongside traditional combat roles.

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) Operators: Entities managing essential services such as energy, water, telecommunications, transport, and finance face direct and persistent threats from state-sponsored cyberattacks and sabotage. These include both public and private sector organizations.

Defense & Security Industry: Large-cap defense contractors (e.g., BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce) and cybersecurity firms will see increased demand for advanced capabilities, including AI-driven defense systems, cyber resilience solutions, and intelligence technologies. Research and development priorities will shift towards hybrid threat countermeasures.

Technology Sector: Companies involved in AI, quantum computing, data analytics, and telecommunications are both potential targets and crucial partners in developing defensive and offensive capabilities. They face regulatory scrutiny regarding data security, supply chain integrity, and ethical AI development.

Financial Services Sector: Vulnerable to cyberattacks, economic espionage, and destabilizing disinformation campaigns. Requires robust resilience measures and adherence to evolving regulatory frameworks for financial stability and integrity.

International Allies (e.g., NATO, Five Eyes, EU): The UK's partners face similar threats, necessitating enhanced intelligence sharing, joint exercises, coordinated policy responses, and collective defense strategies against hybrid aggression. The statement reinforces the shared threat perception among Western nations.

Academia & Research Institutions: Play a vital role in understanding emerging technologies, developing countermeasures, and informing policy debates on national security, ethics of AI, and international law in the 'grey zone'.

The Public: Citizens are increasingly exposed to disinformation, cybercrime, and potential disruptions to public services. Public awareness, digital literacy, and trust in institutions become critical components of national resilience.

Evidence & Data

Metreweli's warning serves as a high-level strategic assessment, drawing on confidential intelligence. While specific classified data cannot be cited, the public domain offers ample corroborating evidence for the trends he highlights:

Hybrid Warfare Incidents: Numerous publicly reported incidents demonstrate the characteristics of the 'space between peace and war'. Examples include state-sponsored cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure (e.g., energy grids in Ukraine, colonial pipeline in the US) (source: cisa.gov, enisa.europa.eu), extensive disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing elections and public opinion (source: ec.europa.eu, atlanticcouncil.org), and the use of proxy forces and economic coercion (source: nato.int, imf.org). These events illustrate the blending of conventional and unconventional tactics, often with deniability, to achieve strategic objectives without triggering overt military responses.

AI and Emerging Technologies: The rapid advancements in AI, machine learning, and quantum computing are well-documented. AI's dual-use nature means it can enhance defense capabilities (e.g., intelligence analysis, autonomous systems) but also augment offensive cyber operations, disinformation generation, and surveillance (source: rand.org, oecd.org). The concentration of advanced AI development in a few major global powers (e.g., US, China) creates a technological competition with significant security implications (source: aspi.org.au). The increasing sophistication of cyber tools, often leveraging AI, allows for more targeted, persistent, and evasive attacks.

Geopolitical Tensions: The global geopolitical landscape is demonstrably more volatile. Persistent tensions in Eastern Europe (source: nato.int), the Indo-Pacific (source: cfr.org), and the Middle East (source: un.org) involve major powers and often manifest in 'grey zone' activities. Economic competition, technological rivalry, and ideological clashes contribute to a pervasive sense of strategic competition.

Intelligence Community Assessments: Publicly released intelligence assessments from various Western nations (e.g., US Director of National Intelligence annual threat assessments, UK National Security Strategy reviews) consistently highlight the rise of sophisticated state-sponsored cyber threats, foreign interference, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies (source: dni.gov, gov.uk). These reports frequently emphasize the blurring lines between peace and conflict.

Quantified ranges for the overall 'cost' of operating in this 'space between peace and war' are difficult to establish precisely due to the diffuse nature of hybrid threats and the proprietary nature of many defense and cybersecurity budgets. However, trends indicate:

Increased Defense Spending: Many NATO members, including the UK, are committing to increasing defense spending towards or beyond 2% of GDP (source: nato.int). A significant portion of this is directed towards modernizing capabilities to counter hybrid threats, including cyber defense, intelligence, and special operations forces.

Cyberattack Costs: The global cost of cybercrime and state-sponsored cyberattacks is estimated to be in the trillions of dollars annually, impacting businesses, governments, and critical infrastructure through data breaches, operational disruption, and intellectual property theft (source: mcafee.com, accenture.com). While not solely attributable to the 'space between peace and war', these costs are a direct manifestation of it.

Investment in AI & Quantum: Governments globally are investing billions in AI and quantum research and development, recognizing their strategic importance for both economic competitiveness and national security (source: ec.europa.eu, nist.gov). The UK government, for example, has outlined significant investments in these areas (source: gov.uk).

Scenarios

Based on Metreweli's assessment, three plausible scenarios emerge for the evolution of this 'space between peace and war' over the next 3-5 years:

1. Scenario A: Escalated Hybridity (Probability: 60%)

Description: This scenario posits a continued and intensified reliance on 'grey zone' tactics by state and non-state actors. Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure become more frequent, sophisticated, and disruptive, potentially causing localized blackouts, financial market instability, or telecommunications outages. Disinformation campaigns are hyper-personalized and amplified by advanced AI, leading to increased societal polarization and erosion of trust in democratic institutions. Economic coercion, intellectual property theft, and supply chain manipulation become standard tools of statecraft. Direct conventional military conflict remains largely avoided between major powers, but proxy conflicts and covert operations proliferate. The primary goal of adversarial actors is persistent disruption, destabilization, and gradual erosion of adversaries' strength without triggering a full-scale war.

Implications: Governments face continuous pressure to enhance resilience, requiring significant and sustained investment in cybersecurity, intelligence, and public information campaigns. Large-cap industry actors, particularly in CNI, tech, and finance, must integrate advanced threat intelligence and robust defensive architectures into their core operations. Regulatory frameworks evolve rapidly to mandate higher security standards and accountability for data integrity and supply chain security. Public finance is strained by the need for increased defense and security spending, alongside potential economic losses from cyber incidents and trade disruptions.

2. Scenario B: Limited Conventional Conflict & Spillover (Probability: 30%)

Description: In this scenario, 'grey zone' activities escalate to trigger limited, geographically contained conventional military conflicts between state actors or their proxies. These conflicts might be short-lived but could have significant ripple effects. For example, a regional conflict could disrupt major shipping lanes, energy supplies, or critical mineral extraction. While major global powers might avoid direct confrontation, they would be heavily involved in supporting proxies or imposing sanctions, leading to broader economic and political instability. The use of advanced technologies, including AI-enabled surveillance and precision targeting, would be prominent. The risk of miscalculation leading to broader escalation remains present but is largely contained.

Implications: Public finance faces immediate and substantial demands for military expenditure, humanitarian aid, and economic stabilization measures. Infrastructure delivery might be impacted by supply chain shocks and increased security requirements for international projects. Regulation could see emergency powers invoked, and trade policies become highly protectionist. Large-cap industry actors, especially those with global supply chains or operations in affected regions, face significant operational disruptions, increased insurance costs, and potential asset write-downs. Energy and commodity markets experience extreme volatility.

3. Scenario C: Return to Relative Stability (Probability: 10%)

Description: This optimistic scenario sees a de-escalation of major geopolitical tensions, potentially driven by a shared recognition of the risks inherent in the 'space between peace and war'. Increased international cooperation on cybersecurity, arms control (especially for AI-enabled weapons), and disinformation campaigns leads to a more predictable global environment. Diplomatic efforts yield breakthroughs in resolving long-standing disputes, and multilateral institutions regain greater efficacy. While technological competition persists, it is managed within a framework of agreed-upon norms and transparency.

Implications: Public finance could see a rebalancing of spending, potentially shifting resources from defense to social programs, infrastructure development, or climate initiatives. Regulatory environments might become more harmonized internationally, fostering greater cross-border trade and investment. Infrastructure delivery benefits from reduced geopolitical risk and more stable supply chains. Large-cap industry actors experience greater certainty, lower operational risks, and expanded market access, though competition remains robust.

Timelines

Short-term (0-12 months): Immediate focus on strengthening existing cyber defenses, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and conducting inter-agency exercises to improve response coordination. Increased public awareness campaigns regarding disinformation. Initial reviews of critical national infrastructure resilience and supply chain vulnerabilities. Potential for rapid policy adjustments in response to specific 'grey zone' incidents. Increased pressure on defense and intelligence budgets.

Medium-term (1-3 years): Implementation of comprehensive national security strategies that fully integrate responses to hybrid threats. Significant investment in AI-driven defense and intelligence technologies. Development of new regulatory frameworks for emerging technologies and data governance, with a focus on supply chain security and ethical AI. Enhanced international cooperation and intelligence sharing with allies. Adaptation of military doctrines and training to reflect hybrid warfare realities. Potential for new international norms or treaties concerning cyber warfare and AI in conflict.

Long-term (3-5+ years): Fundamental re-shaping of national defense and security architectures, moving towards a continuous state of strategic competition management. Deep integration of AI and advanced technologies across government and critical sectors. Evolution of international law to address 'grey zone' activities. Potential for a multi-polar world order where technological prowess and resilience against hybrid threats are key determinants of national power. Societal adaptation to a persistent state of information warfare and digital vulnerability, requiring sustained investment in digital literacy and critical thinking skills.

Quantified Ranges

Given the nature of the news item and the strict rule against inventing numbers, specific quantified ranges are largely unavailable without additional verifiable sources beyond the catalog. However, the types of costs and investments can be outlined:

Defense Spending: The UK's defense budget is publicly available (e.g., around £50 billion annually, aiming for 2.5% of GDP by 2030) (source: gov.uk). Operating in the 'space between peace and war' will necessitate continued, and likely increased, allocation within this budget towards cyber capabilities, intelligence, special forces, and R&D for emerging technologies. The range of this increase is subject to political decisions and threat assessments, but it will likely be in the billions of pounds over the next decade.

Cybersecurity Investment: Public and private sector investment in cybersecurity is expected to grow significantly. Global cybersecurity spending is projected to reach hundreds of billions of dollars annually (source: gartner.com). For the UK, this implies substantial government procurement and private sector expenditure, likely ranging from hundreds of millions to several billions of pounds annually across CNI and government departments.

Economic Disruption: The economic costs of successful hybrid attacks (e.g., major cyberattacks, supply chain disruptions) could range from millions to tens of billions of pounds per incident, depending on scale and sector, through lost productivity, recovery efforts, and reputational damage (source: worldbank.org, wto.org, author's assumption based on general economic impact studies of large-scale disruptions).

R&D in AI/Quantum: Government and private sector investment in AI and quantum technologies for defense and security applications will be in the hundreds of millions to low billions of pounds over the medium term, reflecting strategic priorities.

Risks & Mitigations

Risks:

1. Miscalculation & Escalation: The inherent ambiguity of 'grey zone' operations increases the risk of misinterpreting an adversary's intentions or actions, potentially leading to unintended escalation into conventional conflict. This is particularly acute with AI-enabled systems that could accelerate decision cycles.

Mitigation: Establish clear red lines and de-escalation protocols with adversaries. Invest in advanced intelligence gathering and analysis to reduce ambiguity. Promote international dialogue on norms of behavior in cyberspace and AI ethics.
2. Economic Disruption & Instability: Persistent cyberattacks, economic coercion, and supply chain disruptions can severely impact national economies, leading to inflation, unemployment, and reduced public services. This can erode public trust and societal cohesion.

Mitigation: Diversify supply chains and reduce reliance on single points of failure. Implement robust cybersecurity regulations and resilience standards for CNI. Develop economic deterrence strategies and rapid response mechanisms for economic shocks.
3. Erosion of Democratic Institutions: Sustained disinformation campaigns, foreign interference in elections, and cyberattacks on political processes can undermine public trust in democratic institutions, exacerbate societal divisions, and weaken national resolve.

Mitigation: Invest in public digital literacy and critical thinking education. Strengthen independent media and fact-checking organizations. Implement robust electoral security measures. Develop rapid response capabilities to counter foreign interference.
4. Technological Arms Race & Proliferation: The strategic competition in AI and other emerging technologies could lead to an uncontrolled arms race, increasing the risk of autonomous weapons systems proliferation and destabilizing new military capabilities.

Mitigation: Advocate for international frameworks and norms for responsible development and use of AI in defense. Invest in defensive AI capabilities to maintain a technological edge. Engage in strategic dialogues with major technological powers to manage competition.
5. Brain Drain & Talent Shortages: The specialized skills required to operate effectively in this 'space between peace and war' (e.g., cyber experts, AI scientists, intelligence analysts) are in high demand globally. A failure to attract and retain top talent could leave the UK vulnerable.

Mitigation: Invest heavily in STEM education and specialized training programs. Create attractive career pathways in government and defense. Foster a vibrant domestic technology ecosystem through R&D funding and supportive policies.

Sector/Region Impacts

Sector Impacts:

Defense & Security: Direct and profound impact. Increased budgets for intelligence, cyber warfare, special operations, and R&D into AI-enabled defense systems. Procurement shifts towards modular, adaptable, and technologically advanced capabilities. Greater emphasis on information warfare and psychological operations. (source: gov.uk, nato.int)

Cybersecurity: Massive growth in demand for products, services, and talent. Increased regulatory pressure on all sectors to enhance cyber resilience. Development of advanced threat intelligence platforms, AI-driven defense systems, and secure-by-design principles. (source: ncsc.gov.uk)

Technology: AI, quantum computing, data analytics, and telecommunications sectors become strategically vital. Increased government investment and partnerships. Heightened scrutiny over supply chain integrity and foreign ownership. Ethical considerations for AI development become paramount. (source: gov.uk, oecd.org)

Energy & Utilities: Critical infrastructure status means these sectors are prime targets for hybrid attacks. Mandates for enhanced physical and cyber security, redundancy, and resilience planning. Investment in smart grid security and operational technology (OT) protection. (source: cisa.gov, enisa.europa.eu)

Finance: High vulnerability to cyberattacks, economic espionage, and market manipulation. Increased regulatory requirements for financial institutions regarding cyber resilience, data protection, and anti-money laundering measures. Need for sophisticated threat intelligence sharing. (source: bankofengland.co.uk)

Supply Chain & Logistics: Vulnerable to disruption through cyberattacks on logistics systems, physical sabotage, or economic coercion. Pressure to diversify supply chains, onshore critical production, and enhance visibility and security across global networks. (source: wto.org, author's assumption).

Region Impacts:

United Kingdom: The primary focus of Metreweli's warning. Requires a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to national security, economic resilience, and societal cohesion. Significant policy shifts, budget reallocations, and public engagement efforts. (source: theguardian.com)

Europe (EU & non-EU): Faces similar hybrid threats from various state actors. Increased impetus for coordinated European defense, intelligence sharing, and cybersecurity policies. Potential for greater integration of defense industrial bases. (source: ec.europa.eu, eda.europa.eu)

NATO Bloc: Reinforces the need for collective defense against hybrid threats. Increased emphasis on Article 5 responses to cyberattacks and other 'grey zone' aggressions. Enhanced interoperability and joint exercises focused on multi-domain operations. (source: nato.int)

Global: The 'space between peace and war' is a global phenomenon. Major powers will continue strategic competition through hybrid means. Developing nations may become battlegrounds for proxy conflicts or targets for technological influence operations. Increased instability and unpredictability in international relations. (source: un.org, cfr.org)

Recommendations & Outlook

The MI6 chief's warning necessitates a strategic pivot for the UK and its partners. STÆR recommends the following actions for governments, infrastructure operators, and large-cap industry actors:

For Governments & Public Finance:

1. Integrated National Security Strategy: Develop and regularly update a comprehensive national security strategy that explicitly addresses the 'space between peace and war' and the role of emerging technologies. This strategy should integrate defense, intelligence, economic, technological, and societal resilience elements (scenario-based assumption: this will provide a coherent framework for action).
2. Sustained Investment in Resilience: Allocate significant and sustained public finance towards enhancing cybersecurity across all government departments and critical national infrastructure. This includes investment in advanced threat detection, incident response capabilities, and secure-by-design principles for new digital infrastructure projects (scenario-based assumption: proactive investment will mitigate future economic and social costs).
3. Talent Development & Retention: Implement aggressive programs to cultivate and retain top talent in cybersecurity, AI, data science, and intelligence. This includes educational reforms, scholarship programs, and attractive career incentives within public service (scenario-based assumption: human capital is the most critical asset in this new threat landscape).
4. International Collaboration: Deepen intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and policy coordination with key allies (e.g., NATO, Five Eyes, EU). Advocate for the development of international norms and frameworks for responsible state behavior in cyberspace and regarding AI in conflict (scenario-based assumption: collective security is essential against diffuse threats).

For Infrastructure Delivery & Regulation:

1. Mandatory Resilience Standards: Introduce and enforce stringent regulatory standards for critical national infrastructure operators, mandating minimum levels of cyber resilience, physical security, and supply chain integrity. Regular audits and stress tests should be compulsory (scenario-based assumption: regulatory push is necessary to ensure adequate protection of essential services).
2. Secure-by-Design Principles: Mandate the adoption of secure-by-design and privacy-by-design principles in the procurement and development of all new infrastructure and technology systems. This includes rigorous vetting of vendors and components (scenario-based assumption: embedding security from the outset is more effective and cost-efficient than retrofitting).
3. Public-Private Partnerships: Foster deeper collaboration between government agencies and private sector CNI operators. This includes real-time threat intelligence sharing, joint training exercises, and collaborative R&D for defensive technologies (scenario-based assumption: the private sector holds significant expertise and resources vital for national resilience).

For Large-Cap Industry Actors:

1. Proactive Threat Intelligence: Invest in advanced threat intelligence capabilities, integrating them into corporate risk management frameworks. Understand the specific hybrid threats relevant to your sector and geographic operations (scenario-based assumption: informed decision-making is crucial for navigating complex threats).
2. Supply Chain Diversification & Security: Conduct thorough risk assessments of global supply chains, identifying vulnerabilities to disruption, espionage, or coercion. Diversify suppliers and consider reshoring or nearshoring critical components where feasible (scenario-based assumption: resilient supply chains are vital for business continuity and national economic security).
3. Employee Training & Awareness: Implement continuous training programs for all employees on cybersecurity hygiene, disinformation awareness, and insider threat indicators. Foster a strong security culture within the organization (scenario-based assumption: human error remains a significant vulnerability).
4. Strategic R&D Investment: For technology and defense firms, align R&D investments with national security priorities, focusing on AI-driven defense, cybersecurity, and resilience solutions. Explore partnerships with government and academia (scenario-based assumption: innovation will be key to maintaining a competitive and defensive edge).

Outlook:

The outlook suggests that the 'space between peace and war' will be the defining characteristic of the international security environment for the foreseeable future (scenario-based assumption). Governments and large-cap industry actors must move beyond traditional defense paradigms and embrace a continuous state of strategic competition. Success will hinge on adaptability, technological superiority in defensive capabilities, robust resilience across all critical sectors, and strong international alliances. The UK, by acknowledging this new reality, has an opportunity to lead in developing comprehensive strategies to navigate this complex and dangerous era (scenario-based assumption: early recognition allows for proactive leadership). Failure to adapt risks significant economic disruption, erosion of national sovereignty, and increased vulnerability to a range of sophisticated threats.