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Peace in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro’s Moment of Truth

Peace in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro’s Moment of Truth

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In this photo taken on September 5, 2017 shows a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels (R) aboard a motorcycle, speeding past a military vehicle in Datu Salibo town, Maguindanao province, in southern island of Mindanao. AFP / Ferdinandh Cabrera

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355

/ Asia-Pacific
10 March 2026
20+ minutes

Peace in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro’s Moment of Truth

The peace process in the Bangsamoro, the newly autonomous Muslim-majority region in the southern Philippines, has run into stumbling blocks, including repeated postponements of regional parliamentary elections. Manila and regional authorities should strive to get the transition back on track, lest its promise dim. 

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What’s new? The newly autonomous Bangsamoro region in the Philippines is due to elect its first parliament in 2026, completing the political track of the peace process between Manila and former secessionist rebels that began in 2012. But problems are mounting, including the unfinished demobilisation of ex-combatants and flare-ups of violence.Why does it matter? A series of challenges, from Manila’s repeated interventions in the Bangsamoro’s political life to election delays and growing fissures among the ex-rebels, have put the gains of the peace process at risk. Failure to stabilise the transition could spell trouble for the region.What should be done?  Manila and the ex-rebels urgently need to rebuild trust. Manila should re-commit to fulfilling the peace agreement’s terms, including by delivering socio-economic packages promised to demobilised combatants, while the former rebel movement should rein in feuding commanders to avoid a looming split. Streamlined funding from donors is also essential.

Executive Summary

The peace process in the Bangsamoro, the Muslim-majority parts of the southern Philippines, is at a critical stage. After being delayed several times, regional parliamentary elections may finally take place in the newly created Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) later in 2026. The polls will complete the political track foreseen by the agreement signed in 2014 by the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). While peace in the region has largely held, the process faces major challenges. At the helm of a transitional administration since 2019, the former MILF insurgents have delivered modest peace dividends, but they continue to grapple with political instability and flare-ups of violence. Important provisions of the 2014 accord related to socio-economic development remain unfulfilled, straining relations with Manila. To prevent further setbacks, the two parties should deepen dialogue and reach consensus on how to finish disarming former combatants, while the ex-rebel movement should strive to bridge internal differences so as to ward off the threat of a split.Seven years into the Bangsamoro transition, progress has been uneven. The interim government is almost done enacting key legislation and is providing social services in many areas. Poverty is receding, albeit slowly, and the spectre of widespread jihadism no longer haunts Mindanao. But the region still has the highest rate of illiteracy in the country, and the pace of development remains sluggish overall. The Moros are no longer fighting the Philippine state, but other maladies – entrenched patronage, erratic politics and factionalism – persist. Outbreaks of local violence are also on the rise.A series of unexpected developments has introduced additional complications. One of the BARMM’s original provinces, Sulu, exited the autonomous region after a Philippine Supreme Court decision in late 2024. As a result, Manila put off the regional parliamentary polls from May to October 2025. With just weeks to go, the Supreme Court postponed the vote again, to no later than 31 March 2026. In January, the Philippine electoral commission imposed yet another delay, saying time was too short to organise the ballot. When the elections will happen remains unclear. Tensions between leaders in Bangsamoro and Manila also flared after the national government in March 2025 unilaterally replaced the BARMM’s interim chief minister with someone it saw as more pliant. This decision was poorly received by the MILF leadership, and added to perceptions among Moros that, by repeatedly intervening in the region’s political affairs, Manila has eroded the very foundations of autonomy. Mutual trust has sunk to a new low, and the MILF’s cohesion is under unprecedented stress.The normalisation track of the peace process, a set of measures aimed at making this once war-torn region safe and prosperous, is far behind schedule, with several sticking points hampering progress. More than 26,000 MILF fighters laid down their arms between 2015 and 2022, but the final phase of decommissioning, covering some 14,000 combatants, is deadlocked. Other parts of the normalisation agenda are also stalled: plans to convert MILF camps into peaceful communities remain slow-moving, while transitional justice and amnesty provisions are stuck in bureaucratic limbo. The biggest obstacle, however, is practical: money. Struggling to fund normalisation, Manila has resorted to measures that the MILF denounces as inadequate and contrary to the 2014 accord.Against this backdrop, the repeated delays of the parliamentary elections pose increasing risks. Uncertainty about the election date, coupled with turmoil within the MILF’s leadership, could trigger unrest, whether flare-ups of rebel violence or displays of political discontent.

Manila and the Bangsamoro authorities should urgently take steps to ensure that the peace process does not sputter.

Manila and the Bangsamoro authorities should urgently take steps to ensure that the peace process does not sputter. To begin with, the government and MILF peace panels should meet again as soon as possible to temper the growing distrust between the two parties. While their role has diminished over time, third parties with a confidence-building mandate, which have helped shepherd the peace process along from the start, could help in supporting dialogue. The various MILF blocs, for their part, should recognise the perils of continued infighting and strive to avoid a split. Furthermore, both Manila and the former rebels should recommit to the normalisation agenda, lest the MILF’s ex-combatants lose faith in the peace process. The main stumbling block is the decommissioning of rebel forces, but other issues, such as transitional justice and economic conditions in rebel camps, also require attention. The two sides should also engage in difficult conversations about land tenure disputes and protection for non-Moro Indigenous peoples who have suffered violence at Moro hands.Foreign donors, which have generously supported the transition for the past decade, should help protect the progress made to date by continuing tailored support after the elections eventually occur. The promise of the Bangsamoro peace process has not yet dimmed, but missteps at this late juncture could still fuel a resurgence of fighting.Manila/Brussels, 10 March 2026

I. Introduction

The creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), in the Philippines’ southernmost island of Mindanao, is an effort to address Moro Muslims’ demand for the right to self-determination.
1
For earlier reporting on the peace process and transition, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°s 331, Southern Philippines: Making Peace Stick in the Bangsamoro, 1 May 2023; 323, Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines, 18 March 2022; 322, Southern Philippines: Fostering an Inclusive Bangsamoro, 18 February 2022; 313, Southern Philippines: Keeping Normalisation on Track in the Bangsamoro, 15 April 2021; and 306, Southern Philippines: Tackling Clan Politics in the Bangsamoro, 14 April 2020.Hide Footnote In 2014, after more than four decades of talks with Muslim secessionist groups, Manila concluded a lauded peace deal with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
2
The Malaysian government facilitated the peace talks.Hide Footnote Four years later, the Philippine Congress passed the Bangsamoro Organic Law that established the autonomous region and its boundaries. The entity formally took shape in March 2019 after a two-stage plebiscite, which ratified the law. At least 4 million people from a variety of ethno-linguistic groups live in what are now the BARMM’s five provinces, one Special Geographic Area and three cities.
3
The provinces are Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao del Sur, Maguindanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. (Originally, there were six provinces, but the sixth, Sulu, has left.) The cities are Cotabato, Lamitan and Marawi. The region’s main ethno-linguistic groups are the Maguindanaon, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan and Iranun.Hide Footnote Appointed by the government, the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) has governed the Muslim-majority region since 2019. Apart from ex-rebels, this body includes technocrats, local politicians and representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Mindanao’s first rebel movement, from which the MILF split in 1977.
4
At present, the MNLF has three main factions, with members scattered across the Bangsamoro region.Hide Footnote Other, smaller militant groups, including bands of jihadists, have stayed out of the peace process and are still fighting the state, albeit less fiercely than in the past. The region, however, remains awash in firearms.The peace process follows two tracks that are distinct but intertwined. The first is the political track, which began with the establishment of an interim government exercising executive and parliamentary roles. It will conclude with regional parliamentary elections. These polls were supposed to take place in 2022, but in late 2021 the government extended the transition period from three to six years on account of COVID-19-induced delays in setting up the region’s institutions. The new date was eventually set for October 2025. Just two weeks before the vote, however, the Supreme Court pushed the poll back to 2026, at the latest 31 March. A further delay ensued in January, when the electoral commission said the vote could not be organised in time.
5
Dianne Sampang, “Comelec postpones March 30 Bangsamoro parliamentary elections”, Inquirer, 28 January 2026.Hide Footnote The elections may still take place in 2026, but no date has been fixed.The second element is “normalisation”, which encompasses a wider set of mechanisms for steering the region from conflict to peace, particularly rebel disarmament and socio-economic development projects. There is no timeline for completion of this second track, but the 2014 deal refers to an “exit agreement” that would formally close the peace process once the parties jointly state that the accord’s terms have been fulfilled.
6
“Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro”, p. 4.Hide Footnote

The peace process’s importance goes beyond the Bangsamoro.

The peace process’s importance goes beyond the Bangsamoro. As the Philippine government pivots from focusing on domestic insurgencies to territorial defence, ensuring stability in Mindanao is essential for Manila’s overall security strategy.
7
For more on Philippine strategy, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°349, Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort, 12 August 2025. With much of the Philippine army still in Mindanao, a more stable Bangsamoro would allow for a greater focus on national defence.Hide Footnote The Bangsamoro is also a flagship project for President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. – one he intends to showcase to the world as an example of a durable negotiated settlement.
8
Manila has presented the progress of the Bangsamoro peace process as a point in its favour during its campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council. The vote will take place in mid-2026.Hide Footnote Building upon Crisis Group’s previous work, this report examines the state of play in the autonomous region at a critical time in the peace process. It draws on field research in central Mindanao, Lanao, Sulu, Davao, Zamboanga and Manila, conducted between June 2023 and February 2026, including interviews with MILF, MNLF and military commanders, representatives of the interim regional government, national and local officials, civil society, clan and religious leaders, diplomats, villagers and demobilised insurgents. Women comprised about 40 per cent of the interviewees.

A view from a cafe overlooking Marawi City, capital of Lanao del Sur. February 2026.
CRISIS GROUP / Georgi Engelbrecht

II. A Shaky Political Transition

While aspects of the political transition are on track, the Bangsamoro interim administration has struggled to provide good governance and bring development to all communities in the region. Some obstacles are self-imposed, like flaws in the way the region is now governed, but others stem from Manila’s increasingly ambiguous posture toward the region’s autonomy, which has sown confusion and deepened intra-Moro divisions. Rising levels of political violence and clan feuds are also casting a shadow over the transition.

A. MILF Governance

Tasked with building the autonomous region’s institutions, the interim government led by the ex-rebels has since 2019 set up ministries and departments, put in place a state apparatus and drafted most of the “priority codes” envisaged by the peace accord for the governance of Bangsamoro.
9
These are the administrative code, electoral code, local governance code, education code, Indigenous peoples code and civil service code. The revenue code is still under deliberation. For an overview of the interim government’s achievements and challenges, see David Timberman and Yasmira Moner, “The Bangsamoro Transition Authority and the Forging of an Autonomous Regional Government in Muslim Mindanao”, Institute for Autonomy and Governance, 30 July 2025.Hide Footnote  Though it does not yet raise much revenue by itself, the transitional authority has also been providing basic services to its constituents thanks to a national government subsidy known as the Block Grant.
10
The Block Grant amounts to 5 per cent of the national government’s net revenue. The region also receives 5 billion Philippine pesos ($86.7 million) each year from a Special Development Fund.Hide Footnote  The interim government has shown flexibility in engaging with Manila via the Intergovernmental Relations Body mechanism established in 2019, designed to ensure coordination and handle any disputes that might arise.
11
The body is composed of senior MILF officials and heads of national departments and agencies. It is meant to give the two sides space to discuss issues in a non-adversarial manner. It has convened 21 times since its inception.Hide Footnote  It also converted 63 villages in the Special Geographic Area into eight municipalities, thus providing them with a stronger local administration.
12
“Creation of 8 new towns in BARMM’s SGA ratified”, Mindanews, 14 April 2024.Hide Footnote But the interim period has not been a smooth ride. The Bangsamoro’s feudal political culture has complicated the MILF’s rebels-to-rulers transition, as have a perceived lack of transparency in governance and various forms of socio-economic inequality.Politics have been fraught as the MILF tries to deal with the region’s local governments, often dominated by influential clans.
13
Local governments, such as villages and municipalities, are the Philippines’ smallest administrative units.Hide Footnote  Relations between the MILF and these families fall along a spectrum ranging from active cooperation to outright hostility.
14
When relations between MILF and the clans are good, it is often because they have found an accommodation through allocating positions in the bureaucracy and delivering development projects.Hide Footnote  The ex-rebels have found a modus vivendi with some of the clans. But many saw them as unwelcome competitors from the start.
15
Crisis Group telephone interview, international observer, 21 July 2025.Hide Footnote  A senior MILF commander alleged that clan leaders “opposed to the legitimacy and existence of the Bangsamoro government” have tried to “sabotage” the new arrangements by refusing to work with the interim administration.
16
Crisis Group telephone interview, 14 July 2021.Hide Footnote  By the same token, the former guerrillas have not been particularly forthcoming in reaching out to political rivals.
17
Crisis Group telephone interview, civil society leader from Lanao, 25 February 2021.Hide Footnote  

Allegations of corruption, nepotism and a lack of meritocracy in the civil service have cast a shadow upon the ex-rebels’ efforts to transform the Bangsamoro.

Meanwhile, allegations of corruption, nepotism and a lack of meritocracy in the civil service have cast a shadow upon the ex-rebels’ efforts to transform the Bangsamoro.
18
In early 2025, questions emerged about the possible misuse of funds by the regional administration. Ferdinandh Cabrera, “Lawmaker seeks probe into BARMM funds allegedly funnelled into ‘special operations’”, Rappler, 29 January 2025.Hide Footnote  Some of them seem to be indulging in the same vices of misgovernance for which they have long criticised the clans, for instance doling out political and economic favours to family members. A former BTA member with kinship ties to both the MILF and the clans said: “It is all about your own family and benefit. The clan comes first”.
19
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 8 October 2025.Hide Footnote As for the economy, it has improved in the aggregate, but the statistics can be misleading, as the gains are unevenly distributed.
20
The poverty rate, for instance, declined from 63.2 per cent in 2018 to 46.8 per cent in 2023. The drop is attributed to a variety of factors, such as the absence of large-scale conflict, enhanced farm incomes and fiscal transfers from the national government to the regional government. A parliamentarian, however, said improvements in Lanao del Sur and Sulu (which was part of the BARMM until 2024) have “skewed” the overall statistics. Crisis Group interview, Datu Odin Sinsuat, 12 August 2025.Hide Footnote  As a seasoned development official said, only “urban centres see increased development”.
21
Crisis Group telephone interview, expert, 29 July 2025.Hide Footnote  Highways now link major towns, but they often do not reach remote villages. There are inequities in the countryside as well: agricultural output is robust at the regional level, but in pockets of the Bangsamoro people are subsisting on the bare minimum. The region as a whole still lags behind national standards: many villages lack basic services such as potable water and electricity, and the literacy rate is the lowest in the country.
22
Sherilyn Untalan, “BARMM posts highest illiteracy rate in PH at 14.4% – PSA”, GMA News, 31 July 2025.Hide Footnote  Much-needed reform programs, for example related to land ownership or climate resilience, are only inching along, with some still in the planning stages.Social cohesion among various groups that live in the BARMM is another challenge. The interim government has yet to deliver concrete benefits to all the residents of this ethno-linguistically diverse area. MILF leaders have repeatedly stated that autonomy will help the entire Bangsamoro prosper. But sceptics say the areas inhabited by Maguindanaon or Maranao, two of the region’s major ethnic groups, have often received peace dividends first, noting that most MILF members are from these localities.
23
Even some Maranaos are frustrated. In Marawi City, the capital of Lanao del Sur, 80,000 people remain displaced following a major battle between jihadists and the military in 2017. Resettling them is mainly Manila’s job, but critics say the regional government could have done more to help. Crisis Group interview, local activist, 23 October 2023.Hide Footnote  Residents of the Sulu archipelago, a historical bastion of Moro nationalism populated by Sama, Tausug and Yakan, have complained of being largely ignored.
24
Crisis Group interview, international observer, 31 January 2023. Crisis Group interviews, locals, military officials, Jolo and Patikul, April 2025.Hide Footnote  The Tausug in particular feel that the Bangsamoro regional project does not make sufficient space for their particular ethno-nationalist identity and aspirations.
25
Two Tausug governors from the MNLF previously led the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao: Nur Misuari (1996-2001) and Parouk Hussin (2001-2005).Hide Footnote Non-Moro Indigenous peoples in the BARMM are also having trouble, with many getting threats or being attacked by armed Moro, including MILF commanders.
26
There are five non-Moro groups in the BARMM that fall under the category of Indigenous people: Tëduray-Lambangian, Dulangan-Manobo, B’laan, Higaonon and Erumanen Manobo. Their total population numbers around 130,000.Hide Footnote  In the Tëduray and Lambangian areas of central Mindanao, for example, many have been displaced and dispossessed of their land.
27
Divisions among these peoples, particularly in attitudes toward the MILF, further complicate matters. Crisis Group interview, woman non-Moro Indigenous leader, Datu Odin Sinsuat, 10 August 2025.Hide Footnote  These peoples also say the BARMM (in particular the MILF) has not fully recognised their “non-Moro” identity, including their distinctive heritage and traditions, involved them in decision-making, or respected their right to use land in their ancestral domain, as the autonomy law stipulates it must.
28
Ancestral domain refers to collective ownership of lands claimed by Indigenous peoples in the Philippines and guaranteed by the national government.Hide Footnote  Finally, many non-Moro Indigenous groups complain of poor access to government services and insufficient representation in the regional parliament, as well as in local bodies. That said, the long-awaited passage of an Indigenous peoples’ regional law in December 2024 was a welcome development, as was the August 2025 appointment of a new minister for Indigenous affairs, who is deemed to be more proactive and consultative than his predecessor.
29
Crisis Group interviews, activists and peace process experts, Cotabato City, May-August 2025.Hide Footnote The Bangsamoro peace process also set out to ensure “meaningful” participation for women in political life and to protect women from violence.
30
“Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro”, Part VI, 1 g).Hide Footnote The autonomy law included several provisions in this vein, for example the need to have at least one woman in the regional cabinet; the priority codes, as well as some of the interim government’s resolutions, also contain several relevant gender clauses.
31
A former parliamentarian remarked that women’s organisations played a key role in lobbying for inclusion of relevant language in these documents. Crisis Group interview, Manila, 5 August 2025. The parliament’s revision of the electoral code in late January, which made it easier for smaller parties to run (by lowering the threshold for eligibility from 10,000 party members to 5,000), did not touch the provision requiring that at least 30 per cent of party nominees be women.Hide Footnote To what extent women really are better represented in politics is a matter of debate, with the number of women in the interim government falling from sixteen to ten.
32
In the latest iteration of parliament, three women represent the MILF and two the MNLF. The remaining five women lawmakers come from former government ranks and civil society.Hide Footnote Moreover, the mostly Muslim region remains a generally conservative enclave where pronouncements about women’s rights (beyond their right to representation) do not always translate into change on the ground. Still, many acknowledge at least modest shifts in the discourse of politicians.
33
Crisis Group interviews, observers and former regional officials, Manila, August 2025.Hide Footnote Civil society groups and academics have also tried to support women’s participation in peacebuilding.
34
For example, the Mindanao State University has, with support from the Bangsamoro Women Commission and the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy, created a new diploma for study of women, peace and security.Hide Footnote Overall, many locals say, the euphoria that accompanied the BARMM’s creation in 2019 has turned to cynicism about its capacity to deliver peace dividends.
35
Crisis Group interviews, March-September 2025.Hide Footnote  To a degree, the disenchantment was inevitable. Building new institutions in a region scarred by conflict is inherently difficult, as is socio-economic development. But missteps by the interim government must also get some of the blame.

B. The Sulu Exit and Other Challenges

A major territorial change has also troubled the transition. Sulu, one of the six provinces that were initially part of the BARMM, exited in 2024 following a petition to the Philippine Supreme Court by Abdusakur Tan, Jr., son of the province’s long-time kingpin Abdusakur Tan, who was then its governor. The Tan clan had long criticised the peace process and the MILF, saying an administration dominated by people from Maguindanao (in central Mindanao) would not serve the smaller island provinces’ interests.
36
Crisis Group interviews, Jolo and Patikul, 22-24 April 2025.Hide Footnote  Uneven development during the transition to date has deepened such sentiments in Sulu. In his petition, Tan, Jr. argued that the plebiscite ratifying the Organic Law was unconstitutional: he said Sulu voters should be able to decide whether to join the BARMM independently, not as part of a single poll binding everyone living within the boundaries the law had drawn.
37
Most voters in the BARMM as a whole approved the Organic Law in the January 2019 plebiscite. The majority in Sulu voted no. But because the region’s boundaries had already been drawn by the law, Sulu became part of the BARMM anyway. The no votes stemmed partly from the Tan clan’s adversarial stance toward the Bangsamoro project, but also from genuine sentiment among much of the population that identifies more as ethnically Tausug than as (Muslim) Moro.Hide Footnote  In September 2024, the court decided in his favour, and the ruling became official two months later. It took immediate effect. Regional government programs in Sulu were suspended, though they were later extended through the end of 2025.
38
On 2 August, Sulu formally became part of Philippine administrative Region 9. “Marcos places Sulu under Zamboanga peninsula”, Mindanews, 2 August 2025. A group of MNLF members are unhappy with this situation; reportedly, they are trying to stir up discontent in Sulu. Crisis Group interviews, Sulu residents, Manila, 11 January 2026; 3 February 2026.Hide Footnote Sulu’s exit had an impact on the Bangsamoro as a whole. First, the number of directly elected seats up for grabs under the hybrid system to be used in the planned regional parliamentary elections (see Section IV.A) fell from 32 to 25. The Organic Law had set the overall number of seats, so losing Sulu’s directly elected ones had the effect of leaving seven vacant.
39
The Organic Law, in Art. VII, Section 6, states that the regional parliament shall be composed of 80 members unless Congress increases the number.Hide Footnote  Secondly, the ruling meant that Tan himself would not be running in the regional elections, as he had planned to do despite his doubts about the Bangsamoro project. Thirdly, though many in Sulu and central Mindanao were sanguine about the separation, other politicians and former rebels felt that their vision of a unified Bangsamoro had been tarnished.
40
Crisis Group interview, Patikul, 25 April 2025. Some members of Sulu civil society and political families who are not allied with Tan felt they could work within the autonomous region. They were not against the BARMM in principle. Hide Footnote

C. Manila’s Intercessions

Sulu’s departure from the BARMM was the first in a series of events that have affected Bangsamoro politics since then. On 19 February 2025, President Marcos signed into law a bill postponing the region’s first parliamentary elections from that May – when they would have coincided with mid-term local elections nationwide – to October. A key rationale for the new timeline was Sulu’s exit, with national lawmakers saying the extension would give the BTA time to decide how to fill the seven vacant district seats.
41
Several congressional representatives argued that the interim government also needs to create a new province, Kutawato, to give the eight municipalities in the Special Geographic Area an administrative overlay. Crisis Group telephone interview, source close to the peace process, 4 February 2025. See also Hannah Torregoza, “Ejercito backs creation of proposed Kutawato Province”, Manila Bulletin, 4 December 2024. Lastly, the reset allowed security forces to focus on the May 2025 local elections, rather than deal with the double challenge of preparing for local and parliamentary polls at the same time.Hide Footnote  But in resetting the vote, Manila once again played a decisive role in shaping Bangsamoro politics.Weeks after the postponement, President Marcos also unilaterally imposed a change in the transitional authority’s leadership.
42
Carlito “Charlie” Galvez, who has headed the national government’s peace process office since 2018, was reportedly a key force behind this decision, with some accounts also highlighting the important role of presidential adviser Anton Lagdameo. The move to replace the region’s chief minister drew sharp criticism from the MILF and parts of civil society. In the months that followed, one option considered for strengthening the peace process was to create a separate body – a peace panel distinct from the peace process office, placed directly under the president’s office – to oversee follow-through on the agreement’s main provisions. But President Marcos has not acted on this recommendation. Meanwhile, Lagdameo has assumed de facto control of portions of the peace process. Crisis Group interviews, Manila, August-November 2025; January-March 2026.Hide Footnote On 9 March, he appointed Maguindanao Del Norte Governor Abdulraof Macacua as the region’s interim chief minister, replacing the MILF’s leader, Murad Ebrahim, with immediate effect.
43
Al Haj Murad Ebrahim’s real name is Ahod Balawag Ebrahim. Marcos appointed Macacua as officer-in-charge governor of Maguindanao del Norte in April 2023. From that date onward, an observer noted, he became less involved in the MILF’s internal affairs. Crisis Group interview, Manila, 28 May 2023.Hide Footnote Macacua, also known by the nom de guerre Sammy Gambar, is chief of staff of the MILF’s military wing.
44
By one account, he received the offer as early as the beginning of 2023. Crisis Group interview, source close to the MILF, Manila, 13 September 2024.Hide Footnote  The appointment, which took the MILF by surprise, triggered one of the most severe internal crises in the organisation’s history, leading to fears that it might split.
45
Crisis Group interviews, high-level MILF officials, Cotabato City, May and August 2025.Hide Footnote  Publicly, Manila gave no reason for the change, though officials had long been weighing the idea of replacing Murad, viewing him as driving too hard a bargain on political issues – particularly the extent of collaboration with the clans – as well as the peace process and normalisation. They thought that Macacua would be more inclined to reach compromises with the national government (for details, see Section IV.B).
46
During the transition’s first three years, Manila seemed inclined to back the MILF despite resistance from some of the clans. During 2023, however, the national government had shifted to a formula that would see most of the clans supporting the MILF, preferably under Macacua’s leadership. In addition, around the time of Macacua’s appointment, allegations of corruption in the BARMM under Murad’s leadership became more frequent. Some observers contend, however, that Manila and political figures opposed to the MILF’s central committee have exaggerated the extent of the problem. Macacua has created an anti-corruption task force attached to the chief minister’s office. Crisis Group interview, donor official, 17 November 2025. See also Kenneth Basilio, “Fraud audit sought over BARMM’s alleged anomalous P6.4-B spending”, Business World, 17 March 2025.Hide Footnote A few days later, Marcos took another controversial step, replacing 22 of the 80 members in the regional interim parliament. The new appointees were mostly from the clans, but they also included MILF representatives who did not have the blessing of the organisation’s leadership.
47
A young cadre complained that Manila “handpicked” five new parliamentarians to support the agenda of Macacua and the central government. Crisis Group interview, Davao City, 19 August 2025.Hide Footnote  As a result, the movement’s Central Committee questioned Manila’s claim that the interim government is still led by the MILF, as the autonomy law stipulates it should be.
48
There are contrasting views on this issue. One, shared by many MILF members and civil society figures, is that MILF appointees should be recommended by the Central Committee alone. Another opinion holds that so long as the MILF’s 41 members form the parliamentary majority and the chief minister comes from the MILF, the government is complying with the law. See, respectively, Keith Bacongco, “Is the BARMM still led by the MILF?”, Manila Bulletin, 13 February 2026; and Armando Carandang, “BARMM remains under MILF leadership – Yacob”, Manila Times, 26 October 2025.Hide Footnote  These changes, also reversed gains that had been made in the representation of women and youth, drew criticism from the MILF’s supporters, who view them as counter to the principle of autonomy and the right to self-determination.
49
Carolyn Arguillas, “Women in the Bangsamoro: From 16 each in BTA 1 and 2 to only 10 in BTA3”, Mindanews, 27 March 2025.Hide Footnote The heated mid-term local elections of May 2025 took place against this backdrop. Incidents of violence were common in the lead-up to the polls, with almost daily shootings and dozens of killings, particularly in Maguindanao, though election day itself, when at least six people were killed, was not as bloody as many had feared.
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Frances Mangosing, “PNP: Polls ‘very peaceful’ but violence reported”, Inquirer, 13 May 2025. Supporters and critics of the peace process agreed that an important reason the polls did not go worse was that security forces had deterred violence. Crisis Group interviews, May-July 2025.Hide Footnote  Much of this strife came down to rivalries between local clans, with families mobilising goons in their employ but also members of armed groups. As for the result, the MILF and its allies performed well. Candidates backed by the ex-rebel movement’s political vehicle, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, won the governorships in three of the region’s five provinces (Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Norte), kept the mayorship of the regional capital, Cotabato City, and secured other local positions.Meanwhile, Sulu’s exit from the BARMM continued to reverberate and affect the region’s institutions. In late August 2025, the regional parliament passed Bangsamoro Autonomy Act 77 to delineate new electoral district boundaries, thus redistributing the seven seats Sulu’s departure had left empty. The Supreme Court’s decision in September to postpone regional parliamentary polls, this time to a “date not later than 31 March 2026”, hinged on its finding that this Act and other previous legislation was unconstitutional.
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The court cited a number of procedural and constitutional violations in the redistricting bill, including late filing and flawed reallocation of districts. It also ruled that Autonomy Act 58, which was passed in February 2024 and set up the districts in the first place, is invalid since Sulu is no longer in the BARMM. Press briefer, Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1 October 2025. Iya Gozum, “BARMM polls postponed as SC declares districting laws unconstitutional”, Rappler, 1 October 2025.Hide Footnote The electoral commission gave the regional government until 30 October, a deadline later pushed back to 30 November, to come up with new procedures for redrawing the lines.
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Dianne Sampang, “Comelec: BTA has until Nov. 30 to pass redistricting law”, Inquirer, 4 November 2025.Hide Footnote But the regional government did not finish the task on schedule, passing a new law only on 16 January 2026.
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A major reason was the difficulty of reconciling different MILF blocs and clan interests in shaping the districts, which ultimately led to delays.Hide Footnote With various legal and logistical hurdles standing in the way of preparations for these polls, the electoral commission eventually deferred the elections to an unspecified later date.Sulu’s withdrawal from the BARMM, Manila’s reshuffle of the region’s leadership and the repeated election delays have deepened intra-Moro divisions and destabilised the peace process. “We live in a time of unjust peace”, said a local civil society activist.
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Crisis Group interview, Marawi City, 14 February 2026.Hide Footnote While many people in the Bangsamoro are disheartened by the state of affairs, the extent to which violence may return remains an open question. 

Political campaign poster of the United Bangsamoro Justice Party – the MILF's political arm. February 2026.
CRISIS GROUP / Georgi Engelbrecht

D. Post-agreement Insecurity

Eleven years after the peace agreement, the Bangsamoro’s transition has curbed most insurgent activity, though rebel skirmishes still punctuate the peace while other forms of violence have proliferated. While the ceasefire between the government and the MILF has largely held, misunderstandings can turn deadly. In late January 2025, for example, government troops clashed with MILF fighters in Sumisip, on the island of Basilan, leaving four dead and twelve wounded, as well as displacing around 100 families.
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Bianca Dava, “4 killed, 12 wounded in ambush of soldiers securing UN mission in Basilan”, ABS-CBN News, 23 January 2025. The clash resulted from a lack of coordination between MILF fighters and soldiers escorting UN personnel on a humanitarian mission. Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City, May 2025.Hide Footnote  Other forms of state-rebel violence have subsided, as militants opposed to the peace process are on the back foot following years of counter-insurgency operations.
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Crisis Group interview, senior military commander, Maguindanao del Sur, 10 August 2025. Crisis Group interviews, Patikul and Indanan, April 2025; Cotabato City, Datu Piang and Ampatuan, May 2025; Manila, 18 July 2025.Hide Footnote  Still, residual risks remain: on 23 January 2026, jihadists ambushed army troops in Munai, Lanao del Norte.
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John Unson, “4 soldiers killed in Lanao del Norte ambush”, Philippine Star, 23 January 2026. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack on its media channels. Four days later, gunmen shot another soldier in Pagayawan town in Lanao del Sur. Local sources told Crisis Group that militants are actively recruiting in the Lanao area. Crisis Group telephone interviews, 15 and 31 January.Hide Footnote More worrying is “horizontal” conflict among armed groups. Some are clan feuds (also known as rido or pagbanta); some are clashes between and among politicians and MILF commanders; some are aggressive acts by armed men toward non-Moro Indigenous people in Maguindanao. Local vendettas, which are often related to land disputes but also to political contestation, displace residents, often for a long time, and curb economic development.
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Two incidents in late 2025 have been particularly troubling. The first occurred in Tipo‑Tipo, Basilan, where clashes between MILF members and a local militia displaced more than 10,000 residents. The second incident was a rocket‑propelled grenade attack in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao del Sur, targeting the town’s mayor, who escaped unharmed.Hide Footnote Since 2022, elections have been a particularly important cause of conflict in several hotspots.
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Jason Sigales, “242 dead in 719 election-related incidents in BARMM – group”, Inquirer, 16 May 2025.Hide Footnote  Another source of violence is illicit economic activity, of which there is no shortage in the region.
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This activity includes cigarette smuggling, drug production and trade (particularly of methamphetamines and marijuana), as well as human trafficking.Hide Footnote Violence during political transitions is not rare, but perspectives differ as to how bad it could get in the Bangsamoro. While some observers contend that the current level of violence is “not critical”, others point out that security in the BARMM has steadily deteriorated over the years, with the number of killings as a result of clan feuds and other sorts of conflict increasing since the peace accord.
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Crisis Group interview, Manila, 3 June 2025. Ferdinandh Cabrera, “Watchdog says BARMM crime statistics mask election violence”, Rappler, 15 April 2025.Hide Footnote With these forms of instability on the rise, it is becoming clear that the peace process alone is unlikely to free the region of violent socio-political struggle.

Signs of election fever in Maguindanao del Norte from the mid-term polls in 2025. Parliamentary polls are supposed to take place later in 2026 after being postponed four times. February 2026.
CRISIS GROUP / Georgi Engelbrecht

III. Challenges to Normalisation

Enshrined in an annex to the 2014 peace agreement, “normalisation” refers to a set of measures that the Philippine government and the MILF have agreed to take to assist the Bangsamoro’s transition from conflict to peace in the security, economic and social realms.
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The annex defines normalisation as “a process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihood and political participation within a peaceful deliberative society”.Hide Footnote With the political track nearing its end, despite the latest postponement of the vote, progress on this aspect of the peace process remains far behind schedule.

A. Security Reforms

The peace agreement foresees disarming the MILF in four phases, a process that applies only to weapons originally distributed by the rebels and not to firearms that may be among the ex-combatants’ personal belongings.
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Before 2019, it was commonly assumed that the MILF had 12,000 fighters, but it appears that the ex-rebels agreed verbally with the government to classify 40,000 people, including auxiliaries such as political, intelligence and logistics cadres, as combatants. Crisis Group interview, former government official, 23 December 2019, Zamboanga City.Hide Footnote A total of 26,145 combatants, or roughly two thirds of the former guerrillas, have demobilised so far in the first three phases.
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Only a few hundred women are part of disarmament, as the vast majority of MILF combatants are men. Women did play a role in the armed struggle, however, and they continue to contribute to the movement. Members of the MILF’s Social Welfare Committee have raised concerns about women being left out. Crisis Group telephone interview, 15 August 2025.Hide Footnote The MILF has also decommissioned 4,625 weapons. The final phase, however, is still pending (see below).
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Only 5 per cent of those ex-combatants reside in the six officially registered MILF camps. Carolyn Arguillas, “Only 1,286 out of 26,145 decommissioned combatants are from MILF camps”, Mindanews, 25 August 2025.Hide Footnote In return for the MILF laying down its arms, the government is supposed to provide every ex-combatant with a socio-economic package comprising cash, health insurance, housing, education and livelihood support. Many sources, however, suggest that these packages have thus far been unevenly distributed, leading to a standoff between Manila and the MILF leadership.
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Cash assistance and health insurance have, at least officially, been provided to every decommissioned fighter. Some ex-combatants have received skills training. Some have also been given birth certificates, which many former rebels or their kin required because they had lived in areas with scarce government services or had been displaced by conflict. But other provisions, including the national conditional cash transfer program, social pensions and educational grants, are lagging. The biggest problem concerns housing – not surprisingly, given how many land tenure claims need to be sorted out. Local organisations told Crisis Group that need assessments conducted by government agencies have only scratched the surface. Crisis Group interviews, Davao City, 19 August 2025.Hide Footnote In July, the MILF Central Committee formally put decommissioning on hold, asserting that “not a single [combatant] has successfully undergone a transition to productive civilian life”.
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Resolution passed during the MILF Central Committee Regular Meeting, Camp Darapanan, 19 July 2025. See Vince Ferreras, “MILF defers decommissioning last 14,000 combatants; PH gov’t dismayed”, GMA News, 31 July 2025.Hide Footnote It has since withheld the list of its remaining fighters, saying it will release the names only when Manila lives up to the 2014 accord’s promises not just on the packages but also on all other aspects of normalisation. The government maintains that it has honoured its pledges, pointing to the disbursement of millions of Philippine pesos as evidence of its efforts.
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Darryl John Esguerra, “Gov’t laments MILF delay in final decommissioning phase”, Philippine News Agency, 31 July 2025.Hide Footnote

Beyond rebel disarmament, normalisation also foresees a set of measures to avoid a security vacuum in the region once the MILF has given up its weapons.

Beyond rebel disarmament, normalisation also foresees a set of measures to avoid a security vacuum in the region once the MILF has given up its weapons. A central objective in this regard, which the MILF regularly underscores, is disbanding the Bangsamoro’s private armies – militias controlled by local power brokers. These groups are most often on the payroll of scions of influential clans.
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Crisis Group research points to the existence of several types of private armies. Some are rooted in communities with kinship ties or loyalties to a local leader. A second category of groups resemble criminal organisations, comprising hired goons whose tasks are to advance the leader’s political and financial interests by intimidating, harassing and attacking opponents or extorting rival business owners. A third type performs the function of a protection force for politicians. The protection may be official (such as having police on the payroll), but private bodyguards or paramilitaries may also work in this capacity. To complicate things further, this last category also includes several MILF commanders who are acting on behalf of politicians. Crisis Group interview, Marawi, 26 October 2023. Several of those groups also took part in the electoral violence occurring over the last year.Hide Footnote Progress on this front has been limited: the government created a dedicated task force comprising civilian bureaucrats alongside police and military officers, but it has dissolved only fifteen of the dozens of private armies.Various reasons explain the slow pace of the campaign. First, though disbanding the militias is part and parcel of the peace agreement, these groups pose little threat to the central government, which lowers the incentives for the police and military to go after them.
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Crisis Group telephone interview, peace process observer, 19 November 2021. Military units collect intelligence on these outfits but intervene only if ordered to do so or if the armed groups disturb the peace.Hide Footnote The dedicated task force has little power and meets irregularly; a military officer formerly deployed in the BARMM said the private armies are “perhaps a secondary issue”.
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Crisis Group interview, Manila, 16 November 2022.Hide Footnote  Secondly, the guidelines for identifying what the government calls a “private armed group” are vague, as they refer to groups with at least two armed individuals serving vested political or economic interests. As a result, Manila has tended to focus its effort on smaller outfits that are easier to disband. A third obstacle is the sheer size of the task.
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The government introduced the term “potential private armed group” to describe organisations that exhibit characteristics of these groups but have not routinely engaged in violence. Crisis Group interview, Cotabato City, 10 August 2025. It has disbanded 37 of these “potential” troublemakers, disarming 187 people and seizing 304 firearms. Statement of David Diciano, Office for Bangsamoro Transformation, 31 July 2025.Hide Footnote Meanwhile, these groups continue to put the peace process at risk, as many ex-MILF fighters are hesitant to give up their weapons knowing they will eventually have to live near these militia members, sometimes side by side in the same village.
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Crisis Group interviews, mid-ranking MILF commanders, June-August 2025.Hide Footnote Meanwhile, Manila has been pushing to curb the proliferation of illegal firearms in the Bangsamoro.
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The military considers the proliferation of firearms a driver of violence in the Bangsamoro. But others say it is not the weapons that are the problem but the people who use them, implying acceptance of gun ownership by law-abiding individuals. Crisis Group interviews, senior military officer, Manila, 22 June 2024; former chief of staff, 14 July 2025.Hide Footnote The drafters of the peace deal knew that disarmament would apply only to weapons distributed by the MILF, so they also included a clause expressing the aspiration to collect other small arms and light weapons in the region, including guns that former rebels and civilians had bought themselves. In 2023, a donor-supported program kicked off in Basilan, offering economic benefits to all those who surrendered firearms. The program was later extended to Maguindanao del Norte, but results have been mixed.
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According to government data, the project has allowed the collection of around 8,000 unregistered firearms, which have been stencilled and deposited in military custody. Yet sceptics point out that people were able to procure better firearms after the program’s completion and that the initiative failed to curb violence in Basilan. Moreover, people close to the project said the actual number of collected guns is much lower than 8,000. There was also no strict compliance mechanism. Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City and Manila, May-June 2025.Hide Footnote The peace agreement also foresaw creating a regional police force. It has yet to come into being, however, leaving the MILF frustrated. “We joined this [disarmament] program because there is no other way”, MILF chair Murad explained in a speech. “We cannot be in government and yet have illegal arms. We accepted decommissioning, but we also expected a Bangsamoro police force”.
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Speech by Murad Ebrahim in Camp Darapanan, 9 March 2024.Hide Footnote It seems that this goal will be elusive, however. Manila is uncomfortable with the idea of creating a force distinct to the one responsible for the rest of the country; instead, it has opened a BARMM office of the national police.
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In this regard, President Marcos has echoed his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, who emphasised that the Philippines should have a single national police force. Crisis Group interview, peace process observers, 8 April 2025.Hide Footnote In an attempt to placate the MILF, it has also waived age, height and education requirements for former rebels seeking to join the national police force.Another sticking point between Manila and the MILF is the military garrison that remains in the Bangsamoro. In the absence of a fully staffed police force, the military has kept dozens of infantry battalions deployed across Maguindanao, Basilan and Lanao.
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Some military officers say local governments want the army to stay. Officers assigned in Bangsamoro also said powerful clans enjoy continued support, in some cases even loyalty, from the military. Crisis Group interview, military officer, 11 June 2024.Hide Footnote The peace agreement envisioned that many of these units would be redeployed outside the Bangsamoro, a measure the MILF has repeatedly argued is a “vital” component of normalisation.
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Crisis Group telephone interview, senior MILF commander, 14 July 2021.Hide Footnote So far, however, Manila and the MILF have conducted the required joint assessments for the redeployments in only three towns.
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These are Malidegao, Tugunan and Ligawasan, all in the Special Geographic Area.Hide Footnote  Beyond the MILF’s misgivings, this state of affairs is also a challenge for Manila, as it means that large parts of the military are tied down in Mindanao at a time when the government wants to focus on external threats.
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Five of the army’s eleven infantry divisions are deployed in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. See Crisis Group Report, Riding Unruly Waves, op. cit.Hide Footnote

B. Beyond the Battlefield

Socio-economic support for combatants and their families is a priority for the MILF.
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Crisis Group interviews, 23 January 2023.Hide Footnote The assistance is to include not just the packages for demobilised fighters, but also development and reconstruction projects meant to boost the region’s economy.
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Crisis Group interviews, residents and civil society figures, Cotabato City, Marawi City, Maguindanao del Sur and Maguindanao del Norte, 2022-2025.Hide Footnote A key component is the camp transformation program that foresees six MILF camps becoming “safe and prosperous communities”.
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The six MILF camps in question are: Abubakar as-Siddique, Badre, Bilal, Darapanan, Omar ibn al-Khattab, Rajamuda and Busrah Somiorang. These camps are not so much military facilities as villages where guerrillas and their relatives live side by side with civilians unaffiliated with the movement.Hide Footnote In practice, this program entails building infrastructure such as roads, water systems and electrical grids, establishing access to health and education, and starting community-managed economic projects.The program has made headway. Camp Bilal in Lanao del Norte, under the control of Abdullah Macapaar, aka “Commander Bravo”, now has better road access, a medical facility and vocational training centres. The progress reflects Manila’s perceived need to appease Bravo, who is both an influential MILF commander and a BTA parliamentarian.
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Crisis Group interview, UN official, 1 June 2024.Hide Footnote Camp Abubakar, in Barira in Maguindanao del Norte, has also received attention due to its proximity to the MILF’s administrative headquarters and to the regional capital, Cotabato City. Projects there have focused on farming as well as installation of water points. In the centre of Camp Busrah, Lanao del Sur, the pace of development has also picked up, with a number of new buildings rising.
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Crisis Group, telephone interview, local source, 26 January 2026.Hide Footnote The rate of transformation has been slower in the other camps. In Rajamuda, in the Special Geographic Area, it lags due to the camp’s remote location and a lack of progress in resolving land tenure claims, which would help resettle ex-combatants in new housing.
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Though they lack property deeds, many residents would rather live near their homes than in some of the proposed resettlement sites. Crisis Group interview, development expert, Cotabato City, 15 February 2026.Hide Footnote Building health facilities or housing in Omar and Badre, the two camps in Maguindanao, is particularly complicated as their territory overlaps with the ancestral domain claimed by the Tëduray and Lambangian Indigenous peoples. A series of land disputes have erupted in or near the two areas, leading to Moro gunmen killing dozens of non-Moro Indigenous leaders.
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MILF members were often involved, but influential Maguindanaon clans hold sway over these patches of land as well. A body that, in theory, should allow the Indigenous to voice their concerns is the Joint Task Force on Camp Transformation. Hide Footnote Lastly, clan feuds and squabbles over resources inside the six camps have at times got in the way of development work. 

Transitional justice is [a] vital element of normalisation, but there again, little has happened.

Transitional justice is another vital element of normalisation, but there again, little has happened.
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After the peace agreement, a transitional justice and reconciliation body consulted with conflict-affected communities and developed several recommendations for the national government and the BARMM. “Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission”, 2016.Hide Footnote In January, after years of inaction, the MILF and government peace panels approved a roadmap that follows two tracks: first, the creation of Bangsamoro and national commissions to take the lead on transitional justice, for instance by writing an official historical record of the Bangsamoro conflicts; and secondly, a series of policies that various national and regional agencies are meant to roll out to address historical injustices.
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On 28 January, the interim government approved a law creating the regional commission. Workshops to expedite the national commission’s formation are under way, with a tentative target date of mid-2026 for getting it up and running. Crisis Group telephone interview, source close to the process, 2 February 2026.Hide Footnote But these plans do not always align with the expectations of common people in rural areas, who would prefer financial compensation, support for community-based socio-economic projects or formal apologies from the state for past violence.
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Crisis Group interviews, Carmen, 24 October 2024; Crisis Group telephone interview, local peacebuilding expert, 29 July 2025.Hide Footnote People would also like quicker results than seem to be on offer.Even more worrying is the delay in issuing the amnesties for former MILF fighters that the peace agreement envisioned. The ex-rebels have submitted just over a thousand applications, and they are frustrated that only a few have been approved.
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Bong Sarmiento, “With deadline just 2 months away, NAC seeks for amnesty application”, Mindanews, 7 January 2026.Hide Footnote The National Amnesty Commission, which is handling the task, is also overseeing cases related to other insurgencies. Many MILF cadres have been advocating for a separate, dedicated body. As things stand, commanders and fighters with old charges pending against them can be arrested with a warrant at any time.
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Some MILF members who filed for amnesty have received or expect to receive “safe conduct passes”, which are valid pending review of their amnesty applications. But not everyone has, meaning that many cadres are concerned about being arrested. Crisis Group interviews, source close to the MILF, 21 March 2024; senior MILF commander, 12 August 2025.Hide Footnote

C. One Word, Two Visions

At the heart of the delays in normalisation lies a divergence of views over what the process should entail. The ex-rebels cite the peace agreement to argue that normalisation must be “commensurate and implemented in parallel”; in other words, the government needs to deliver on its promises as disarmament occurs, not later.
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Crisis Group interview, Cotabato City, 25 October 2022. See Annex on Normalisation, Section S.9.Hide Footnote In addition, the MILF insists on joint decision-making in all aspects of the peace process, as stipulated in the 2014 agreement. Disgruntled MILF cadres call the government’s approach to normalisation “crooked implementation” of the accord.
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Crisis Group interview, senior MILF commander, Cotabato City, 12 August 2025.Hide Footnote In their own defence, Philippine officials say the government has tried hard to deliver peace dividends by continuously allocating funding and launching a variety of programs under the rubric of normalisation.
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Executive Order No. 158 from 2021 mandates the peace process office to “manage, direct, integrate and supervise” implementation of the peace agreement. The agreement has a matrix that lays out the sequencing. Some benchmarks, however, have been overtaken by events.Hide Footnote They believe that Manila should be steering the ship, both because the government is ultimately responsible for safeguarding peace in Mindanao and because some officials consider parts of the accord to be flawed.
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Crisis Group interviews, peace process officials, 17 November 2025. Manila is especially critical of security-related provisions, such as decommissioning of fighters.Hide Footnote A big point of discord between the sides is the “local normalisation initiative”, an attempt by Manila to speed up service provision in areas where many MILF cadres live.
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The initiative, developed by the government in support of the peace accord in 2024, is largely handled by the Inter-Cabinet Cluster Mechanism on Normalisation, which is also responsible for raising and channelling the money to fulfil the peace agreement’s terms as well as taking stock of normalisation interventions in recent years. Crisis Group interviews, regional and national officials, Manila, 1 August 2025; and by telephone, 3 March 2026.Hide Footnote The idea is to put provincial governments, rather than the central government, in charge, so as to nurture local ownership of these services. Proponents say these local leaders, who often belong to major clans, know their communities best and should be able to decide what residents need.
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The national peace process office signed agreements on local normalisation with most of the BARMM provinces. As of August 2025, only Maguindanao del Sur and the Special Geographic Area lacked such an arrangement.Hide Footnote In practice, the main result so far has been the arrival of “service caravans” – day-long visits by national and local government agencies to villages in the BARMM to offer medical care, food and livelihood support such as seedlings. This approach may prove efficient in some cases, but the MILF peace panel points out it is a far cry from what the peace agreement says should happen, namely that Manila and the MILF should together oversee comprehensive normalisation, not piecemeal efforts. Moreover, they say, Manila should have coordinated the initiative with the ex-rebels.For normalisation to move ahead, the two sides’ peace panels urgently need to resolve this disagreement, along with several others, including the impasse over disarmament. But these panels have not convened regularly in the last years.
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Technical-level sessions have continued. For the MILF, the peace panel meetings remain vital, as it considers them the sole venue for making major decisions. In recent years, both sides have regularly asked to postpone meetings; personal frictions among key figures have also played a role in stalling progress.Hide Footnote Talks planned for July in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur, a traditional venue for government negotiations with Moro insurgents prior to the 2014 agreement, were cancelled just a few days before they were to begin. The government backed out, because it had not reappointed key peace panel members whose terms had lapsed and because the MILF had not submitted a list of combatants for demobilisation. The two panels finally met on 19 December 2025 in Davao City. Little of substance was accomplished, but some observers noted that the fact the meeting took place at all was an achievement.
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The two sides created a technical working group to assess the peace accord’s progress. They also discussed the status of the socio-economic packages for MILF ex-combatants. Joint statement by the government and MILF peace panels, 19 December 2025. On file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote In mid-February, presidential assistant Cesar B. Yano, who had headed the government panel, submitted his resignation.
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At press time, it was unclear if the president had accepted Yano’s resignation. It was his second attempt to step down, following one in August 2025 that Marcos declined. Crisis Group interviews, March 2026.Hide Footnote In principle, third parties could help strengthen dialogue between the sides, but so far, those previously involved in the peace process have struggled to break the deadlock. The Malaysian government, which hosted the talks that led to the 2014 agreement, could play such a role and, by some accounts, is keen to do so.
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Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Manila, 24 July 2025; Crisis Group telephone interview, source close to the process, 22 October 2025.Hide Footnote Manila is reticent, however, because it considers the peace process to be a domestic affair.
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Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Manila, 1 June 2024. After a long absence, the Malaysian facilitator did join the peace panel meeting in December 2025 as an observer.Hide Footnote For its part, the International Contact Group, a body comprising NGOs and governments that supported the Malaysian facilitator in the talks leading to the accord, has been trying to rebuild confidence, but a July meeting with the two sides to develop ways forward fell through.
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Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Manila, 17 May 2024.Hide Footnote Finally, the Third-Party Monitoring Team, the body officially mandated to oversee the peace process, has conducted regular visits to the BARMM and Manila, interacting with both sides, but its functions are limited to periodic reports and public diplomacy.
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The team is chaired by a retired European diplomat and includes members from Australia and Türkiye, as well Philippine representatives.Hide Footnote Thus, the prospects for a breakthrough on the issues holding back normalisation look bleak. “We need a reset”, a Philippine official confided. “And so far, nothing has helped us achieve this”.
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Crisis Group interview, peace process insider, 30 May 2025. Hide Footnote

D. Funding Concerns

The MILF and Manila have been at loggerheads for years over who should pay for normalisation. The ex-rebels want Manila to bankroll the various development programs, as the peace agreement states, while the Philippine government believes the MILF-led interim regional government should chip in by tapping into the Block Grant it receives from central authorities to pay for public services.
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Crisis Group interview, government official, 16 January 2024.Hide Footnote The disagreement means that there has never been enough money for the ambitious plans. Meanwhile, some BARMM agencies have in recent years distributed funds to combatants and former fighters without clear accounting, meaning that the extent of these payments is unknown.
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Some claim that government officials have also provided financial support to MILF commanders in hopes of gaining their endorsement of Manila’s policies. Crisis Group interview, Manila, 26 August 2025.Hide Footnote Foreign donors have proven generous in funding various components of normalisation.
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The biggest donors have been Australia, Japan and the European Union. Overall, according to Crisis Group data, foreign states and bodies have given at least $125 million to the peace process since 2019.Hide Footnote But with world crises multiplying and development money dwindling since USAID’s demise, they may gradually cut back.
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Crisis Group interviews, donor officials and NGO staff, 2 June 2024. In all, the investment needed appears to be reaching $176 million. A case in point is the decommissioning body, which administers rebel disarmament. Donors are still paying staff salaries, but in effect the process has been on hold for years.Hide Footnote Some foreign governments that were once optimistic about the Bangsamoro’s future now harbour doubts about the peace process, particularly whether it can deliver political stability and economic benefits.
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Several donor officials said the major problem is fragmentation within the MILF but also in government circles, exacerbated by bureaucratic delays on both sides. Crisis Group interviews, 2023-2025.Hide Footnote Others are still committed, especially since they view Mindanao’s stability as a condition for Manila’s pivot to external defence, which they welcome in light of rising tensions with China. But they are also understandably keen to see tangible outcomes after giving so much financial support over the past decade.
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Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Manila, 9 July 2025. Some donors have reallocated their funding for the Philippines to other areas, such as maritime security and governance.Hide Footnote Funding will not disappear overnight. But peacebuilding organisations are coming to terms with the prospect that development aid for the Bangsamoro will taper off.
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Crisis Group interview, Manila, 18 July 2025. Hide Footnote To what extent the central government is committed to financing the peace process, especially after President Marcos leaves office in 2028, is an open question.

IV. Obstacles on the Path to Elections

Almost twelve years after its signing, the Bangsamoro peace agreement faces a number of serious hurdles. Parliamentary polls that were meant to conclude the accord’s political track have been repeatedly postponed. Rising factionalism within the MILF, aggravated by Manila’s interventions as rival camps compete for influence, threatens the peace process with paralysis or worse.

A. An Elusive Vote

Parliamentary elections will give the people of the Bangsamoro the opportunity to elect regional representatives for the first time. The region will use a hybrid system: half the parliament will be elected through proportional representation via party lists, while the other half will comprise local district representatives chosen directly by the public (32 seats). Eight seats will be allocated to deputies representing women and specific Bangsamoro communities.
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The electoral code mandates that every party list of candidates be made up of at least 30 per cent women. The representatives occupying the eight sectoral seats will be elected by assemblies of non-Moro Indigenous people, settlers (ie, Christians), women, young people, Islamic scholars and traditional leaders. Citizens often struggle to fully understand the new voting system. Crisis Group interviews, Manila and Cotabato City, January-August 2025.Hide Footnote But the series of postponements of the polls has created uncertainty. When the elections were reset for March 2026, politicians from across the spectrum welcomed the delay, believing it would provide them with more time to mobilise support. Reactions among the electorate were mixed, ranging from concern to quiet acceptance or indifference.
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Crisis Group telephone interviews, 1-6 October 2025.Hide Footnote Critics, on the other hand, argued that the deferral illustrated once again that the Bangsamoro’s political fate remains at the mercy of the central government, with some also lamenting the judiciary’s outsized influence.
117
Crisis Group interview, expert, 1 October 2025.Hide Footnote They complained that Manila was dragging its feet in the peace process, undermining autonomy and distorting the competition for local power.
118
Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City and Marawi, 2023-2025.Hide Footnote Some also contended that repeatedly putting off the polls has “undermined public confidence” in the transition.
119
Lalay Ramos-Jimenez, “BARMM’s autonomy on hold: Elections postponed, transition extended”, Manila Times, 5 October 2025.Hide Footnote The decision to call off the March polls, in turn, has disillusioned many in civil society.
120
Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City and Marawi, 12-15 February 2026.Hide Footnote A Philippine senator went so far as to say that “political monsters” had derailed the peace process.
121
These comments appear in a video posted to Facebook on 10 February 2026.Hide Footnote Two scenarios for the polls have begun to take shape. One is that the elections could still occur in 2026, with one bill before the Philippine Congress angling to set the date on 28 September.
122
A different resolution calls for polls to be held on 14 September. Ferdinandh Cabrera, “House bill seeks to fix BARMM elections on September 28”, Rappler, 22 January 2026; and Herbie Gomez, “Senate panels back September 2026 BARMM elections”, Rappler, 6 February 2026. The two bills would need to be reconciled.Hide Footnote For some observers of the peace process, this scenario is the most likely and the one they strongly support.
123
Crisis Group interviews, Manila, January-February 2026.Hide Footnote A second possibility is that the polls could be put off until 2028, which would coincide with the next national vote, including the presidential election.
124
Philippine law stipulates that local and national elections be synchronised. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, 17 November 2025.Hide Footnote Sceptics of that option warn that public enthusiasm for the transition has already dimmed.
125
Raihan Yusoph, “How Bangsamoro’s political transition got stuck”, New Mandala, 21 October 2025.Hide Footnote In the long run, they say, the repeated delays might deepen public apathy, and in the worst case, lead some Moros to express their grievances violently.

B. MILF Cohesion under Stress

One flashpoint might be infighting within the MILF, the dominant force in the appointed interim parliament. Unlike its precursor, the MNLF, the MILF has historically kept its ranks intact. Some splintering notwithstanding, most of its political and military apparatus has stayed united behind the Central Committee, though local commanders have enjoyed a degree of autonomy. It remains an organisation in which ethno-linguistic characteristics, kinship ties and personal relationships shape loyalties.Maintaining cohesion became more complicated when the transition began in 2019. A common old-guard observation is that the MILF had a sudden influx of recruits who wanted to join only for “benefits” associated with the peace process.
126
Crisis Group interviews, MILF members, 15 December 2019; May 2025.Hide Footnote Disagreements about political positioning have also emerged in the group, which has undergone several organisational changes since it formed a party to contest local elections in 2022.
127
Crisis Group interview, MILF members, 2022-2024.Hide Footnote Fissures started to appear during those polls: though the group’s chairman and then Bangsamoro chief minister, Murad, instructed members to vote for MILF-linked candidates, several commanders and their followers rallied behind other local politicians instead.
128
As laid out in Section II.A above, the MILF leadership has taken an inconsistent stance toward cooperation with powerful families. But individual rebel commanders have often formed close ties with these local politicians, in effect favouring their kin and community over the organisation.Hide Footnote Later that year, the movement’s leadership also faced criticism from the “Salamat wing”, an informal grouping of MILF and ex-MILF personalities.
129
Crisis Group interviews, senior MILF leaders and commanders, Cotabato City, 23-25 October 2022. Hide Footnote

Internal tensions [within the MILF] peaked in March 2025, following Manila’s decision to impose changes in the BARMM’s leadership.

Internal tensions peaked in March 2025, following Manila’s decision to impose changes in the BARMM’s leadership. Political differences became more apparent between Murad and MILF peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal, on one side, and military leader Macacua, on the other, following Macacua’s appointment as interim chief minister (see Section II.C). Aside from personal ambition, the rift relates to Macacua’s more conciliatory approach to engaging with the national government and the clans. The rivalry has been acrimonious.
130
Crisis Group analysis suggests that online debate has become deeply polarised, due partly to trolls and influencers. Crisis Group interviews, October 2025.Hide Footnote  Several interlocutors told Crisis Group that, on more than one occasion in recent months, the Central Committee has come close to expelling Macacua. On 21 August, the MILF leadership convened a meeting at which many commanders pledged loyalty to Murad.
131
The MILF’s military structure comprises seven fronts, divided into more than 30 base commands.Hide Footnote  Macacua was not there.
132
Central Committee representatives argue that Macacua has not attended meetings for some time now, but whether he continues to receive invitations remains an open question.Hide Footnote Exacerbated by delays in the peace process and Manila’s repeated interventions, divisions in the movement are showing. Most commanders base their allegiances less on attitudes toward Manila than on loyalty to particular leaders, as well as personal and economic interests. Several of the most prominent front commanders and their subordinates seem aligned with Murad, while some base commanders, particularly in central Mindanao, appear supportive of Macacua.
133
Crisis Group interview, source close to the movement, Davao City, 19 August 2025. As “commander of the faithful”, Murad has a formal legitimacy that Macacua, even though he has been MILF’s military leader since 2003, does not. Iqbal, promoted to MILF vice chair in March 2025, commands deep respect as the head negotiator, for instance with younger MILF intellectuals. Macacua’s reach is not as extensive, though he has been trying to increase his influence with field commanders and religious leaders. Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City and Manila, July-August 2025.Hide Footnote  In early September, the MILF’s Central Committee suspended nine commanders perceived to be close to Macacua. The main reason was their apparent involvement in normalisation activities that the MILF had suspended.
134
Crisis Group telephone interviews, 3-6 September 2025. See also Edwin Fernandez, “MILF leaders pledge unity amid worries over internal friction”, Inquirer, 8 September 2025.Hide Footnote  Some of these commanders visited Murad in the aftermath to clear their names, but others denied the charges of non-compliance levelled against them.
135
Crisis Group telephone interviews, September 2025.Hide Footnote  As of early 2026, it seems that most of the sanctioned commanders have quietly returned to the Central Committee fold.
136
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 2 February 2026.Hide Footnote  Yet many of them continue to side with Macacua over Murad.These tensions have had adverse effects on the MILF’s cohesion. Given the lack of a firm date for the regional parliamentary polls, many cadres have tried to avoid choosing between Murad and Macacua.
137
Crisis Group interviews, Parang, 13 February 2026; Cotabato City, 15 February 2026.Hide Footnote  Others remain confused about what is happening, simply bemoaning the discord.
138
Crisis Group interviews, Maguindanao del Sur, 13, 15 and 16 February 2026.Hide Footnote  One issue pushing many commanders toward hedging is the uncertainty about who might eventually succeed Murad as MILF chairman should a change in leadership occur.
139
Murad and other MILF leaders have faced health problems of late.Hide Footnote  Many observers, but also members of the movement, increasingly perceive the main MILF rivalry to be between Iqbal and Macacua.
140
Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City, 16-17 February 2026.Hide Footnote  Seeking to project unity, the Central Committee convened regional assemblies from 13 to 16 February, at which, once again, it concentrated on urging Manila to honour the peace agreement.
141
The rallies took place in Cotabato City, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao del Sur, the Special Geographic Area and Basilan.Hide Footnote  Some observers considered the speeches at these rallies to be “sabre-rattling” aimed at sending a message to Manila. Meanwhile, Macacua threatened to remove a number of BTA officials he perceived as hostile.
142
Crisis Group interviews, MILF political officer; source close to the MILF, Cotabato City, 16 February 2026. Despite the tensions, a sign of possible rapprochement came when Macacua visited Murad’s residence at the onset of the Ramadan fast. Ali Macabalang, “Ramadan prompts BARMM, MILF chiefs to reconcile”, Manila Times, 20 February 2026.Hide Footnote The rift in the MILF raises various concerns. Tensions between the Central Committee and Manila could escalate into something worse, particularly if either the MILF or the national army violates the ceasefire between them.
143
Several interlocutors noted that the MILF Central Committee sought to establish new units within its military structure. Crisis Group telephone interviews, 30 August 2025; 28 January 2026. Crisis Group interview, source close to the MILF, Manila, 29 January 2026.Hide Footnote  Hostilities could also flare within the movement. If Murad and Iqbal sense that Manila and the Bangsamoro clans, possibly abetted by Macacua, plan to sideline them in the run-up to the elections, their supporters among mid- and lower-ranking commanders might lash out against the government or their comrades who back Macacua.
144
In the past, clan conflicts have triggered organisational infighting. The danger that such feuds could combine with MILF factional disputes is rising. Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Manila, 28 January 2026.Hide Footnote  On the other hand, if the Central Committee formally expels Macacua and/or commanders loyal to him, intra-MILF tensions in areas such as Maguindanao and the Special Geographic Area could escalate.
145
Crisis Group interviews, Lanao and Maguindanao, 9-14 February 2026.Hide Footnote  These risks would extend into the aftermath of the elections, when they eventually occur. Should Macacua and his allied clans win a parliamentary majority and claim power after the vote, the MILF might nominally remain in charge of the BARMM, but the Central Committee could be weakened, stirring discontent within the ranks. 

Signs that the frictions [within the MILF] might turn violent are starting to show.

Delaying the polls until 2028 might offer the MILF time to regroup, but conversely, internal divisions could also linger and widen. They might spill into national politics, with rival MILF leaders backing different presidential candidates after Marcos’s term ends. Signs that the frictions might turn violent are starting to show. “I told my men to go to the mountains, to be ready”, confided a cadre.
146
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 11 July 2025.Hide Footnote How younger MILF members position themselves will be critical.
147
By many accounts, the movement has also been sluggish in cultivating a new generation of leaders to succeed the old guard. Crisis Group interviews, Manila, November 2025.Hide Footnote  The MILF leadership may lose credibility with young fighters, some of whom are unhappy with the internal dissension. If the peace process continues to lag, these frustrated guerrillas could break away to pursue their own agenda.
148
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 11 July 2025.Hide Footnote  They could turn to crime or join the ranks of private armies, contributing to feuding and lawlessness in the BARMM.
149
Crisis Group interviews, Manila and Cotabato City, July-August 2025.Hide Footnote  They could also return to the battlefield, either as a MILF splinter or as part of militant outfits that have refused to join the peace process.
150
Crisis Group interviews, Maguindanao del Norte and Maguindanao del Sur, August 2025. Most of the remaining active jihadist groups are in Lanao. Crisis Group interview, analyst, Manila, 11 November 2025.Hide Footnote  A military officer mused that a loosely coordinated jihadist network run by educated cadres could emerge, eventually expanding to urban areas.
151
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 4 July 2025.Hide Footnote  A reinvigorated insurgency in the Bangsamoro remains unlikely, but it is a troubling possibility should the peace process falter.
152
A member of the Third-Party Monitoring Team has warned of this possibility. “Exclusive interview: Peace monitor warns stalled Bangsamoro process could fuel ISIS activity”, Muslim Network TV, 21 February 2026.Hide Footnote

In February 2026, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front conducted several assemblies across the Bangsamoro region. February 2026.
CRISIS GROUP / Georgi Engelbrecht

V. Revitalising the Peace Process

Amid electoral uncertainty and continued delays in normalisation, Bangsamoro’s future lies in the balance. The best case is that the MILF remains confident that the peace process, despite its flaws, is leading to genuine autonomy. In this scenario, the organisation would resolve the decommissioning impasse with Manila. It would also arrive at an internal power sharing compromise that suits Murad, Iqbal and Macacua, as well as other political blocs like the clans. The region should then be stable enough that political disputes do not lead to violence.The second, and at the moment more likely, scenario is continuation of the status quo, with the MILF divided into factions, but with both the Central Committee and the chief minister staying committed to the peace process on the grounds that a mediocre peace is preferable to war. Clan conflict, political violence and governance challenges would remain regular features of Bangsamoro life in this eventuality.
153
Crisis Group interview, international development expert, Manila, 20 May 2024.Hide Footnote The worst-case scenario is renewed armed conflict, which could come in two forms. The MILF could break apart, with some of its fragments, perhaps fused with other Moro militants, lashing out at the government on the grounds of unfulfilled promises.
154
In public, the ex-rebels’ leaders say they would return to war only in self-defence should the government attack. Record of a speech on file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote Or, more likely, the Bangsamoro could see a dramatic increase in political violence and clan feuding, leading to “anarchy” in parts of the region.
155
Crisis Group interviews, Manila and Cotabato City, July-August 2025.Hide Footnote To avoid these dangers, the two sides should take concrete steps to revitalise the peace process. 

A. Bridging the Trust Deficit

The most urgent task is to rebuild trust between the parties, which was corroded by Manila’s unilateral decision to change the region’s chief minister. Direct dialogue remains the best way to do so; the fact that the two peace panels have seldom met over the last few years had stoked rancour on both sides. Following their December 2025 gathering, the panels should meet again as soon as possible in order to agree on a timeline for proceeding with normalisation and decide how to handle contentious subjects such as funding and the MILF’s final disarmament. For that to happen, Manila will need to urgently resolve the question of who will chair its panel, so as to ensure that the MILF has a clear counterpart in the process. The panels should also speed up the drafting of a roadmap to accelerate implementation of the peace agreement, focusing on key socio-economic issues such as packages for ex-combatants and the transformation of camps.
156
The technical working group developing the roadmap has completed the terms of reference that the peace panels need to approve. Crisis Group telephone interview, 3 March 2026.Hide Footnote Given the level of mutual suspicion, the two sides should urgently organise a meeting for President Marcos with MILF chairman Murad and other Central Committee members.The mechanisms that built confidence in the peace agreement also need reinforcing. The Third-Party Monitoring Team is currently the most active. Though its mandate is limited, it should continue to raise awareness of the challenges to the peace process in both Manila and Cotabato City, among decision-makers on both sides, the diplomatic corps and the public. Another potential asset is Malaysia, which could revive its role as facilitator of the 2014 accord with Manila’s consent. With the support of Kuala Lumpur’s Philippines-based diplomats, the Malaysian special adviser should engage in quiet shuttle diplomacy between Manila and the MILF to convey messages addressing both parties’ concerns. Thirdly, the International Contact Group, the informal body created to support the peace process, should work with mid-ranking bureaucrats from the MILF and the government to keep dialogue going and help the parties identify priorities for discussion, for example regarding the roadmap.Finally, it is vital that the regional parliamentary elections be held without additional delay. Congress should swiftly enact legislation setting the date, guided by the proposals to hold the polls in September. Doing so would prevent further erosion of the regional administration’s legitimacy on the ground, avert the risk of widening divisions within the MILF and bring closure to the political track of the peace process.
157
Crisis Group interviews, Cotabato City, Marawi and Manila, February-March 2026.Hide Footnote

B. Avoiding a MILF Fracture

The change in the MILF’s leadership and the movement’s internal divisions have heightened the risks to the peace process. A fragmented movement in which factions compete for influence threatens the fragile equilibrium in Mindanao, as competing loyalties within the MILF could trigger clashes between commanders or allow hardline figures to go back to a secessionist agenda.
158
Crisis Group interview, security analyst, Manila, 28 January 2026.Hide Footnote Preventing a decisive rupture within the movement requires deliberate, carefully sequenced interventions. At a minimum, the MILF Central Committee should extend a formal invitation to Macacua for renewed dialogue, in the spirit of organisational unity.
159
Crisis Group telephone interview, international observer, 30 January 2026.Hide Footnote In parallel, Macacua would need to commit to continued engagement within the MILF’s political party. He would also need to reconnect with the Central Committee.Other steps could help to bridge the divide in the movement, though outsiders should be careful to recognise the limits on what they might achieve. First, traditional Moro leaders, for instance influential Maguindanao and Iranun clans such as the Ibays, Midtimbangs or Masturas, could serve as intermediaries in consultations. Secondly, the Bangsamoro parliament could consider creating an office of peace agreement custodian, a role that Murad could occupy.
160
The interim government’s administrative code allows for creating such an office.Hide Footnote That office should monitor the peace agreement’s progress from the MILF’s perspective, preserve the historical record of negotiations, and advise on peace-related legislation and policy. Thirdly, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, a global forum of majority-Muslim countries, through its committees on Muslim minorities and public affairs and its peace committee for the southern Philippines, could seek to shore up the movement’s cohesion.
161
Murad told Crisis Group that the Organisation has been a trusted interlocutor. Crisis Group interview, Camp Darapanan, 11 August 2025. It has been following the peace process between the Philippine government and Moro groups since the 1970s and helped facilitate the 1976 peace agreement with the MNLF. Its last mission to Mindanao was in late January 2020.Hide Footnote It could do so by issuing a public statement and undertaking a mission to Mindanao to signal its longstanding commitment to the unity of the Moro movement.

C. Living Up to Normalisation

It is equally pressing to get normalisation on track. The peace accord assigns the lion’s share of responsibility for normalisation to the national government, and Manila must treat it as a priority, including in terms of funding. There are several ways to get past the current impasse. First, for the 2027 fiscal year, the peace process office should allocate at least 50 per cent of its budget to the Bangsamoro.
162
For the last four years, the majority of the office’s budget was dedicated to the flagship Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) program. PAMANA is a nationwide development program for conflict-affected areas, with a focus on infrastructure projects but also covering domains such as livelihood support and health. Its budget for 2025 alone was more than two thirds of all government expenditures on the Bangsamoro peace process since 2014.Hide Footnote Secondly, presidential special assistant Anton Lagdameo should keep normalisation firmly on President Marcos’s agenda and pinpoint priority areas where international partners can lend support ahead of an envisioned March meeting. In that session, the government would present updates on the progress of normalisation to national bureaucrats, civil society and donors.
163
Crisis Group telephone interviews, 3 March 2026.Hide Footnote Thirdly, executive secretary Ralph Recto, who is close to the president, should coordinate national agency support for the Bangsamoro, with a view to wrapping up the peace process.
164
Crisis Group interview, governance expert, Manila, 1 March 2026. Recto’s expressed emphasis on “social protection”, namely government initiatives aimed at alleviating poverty, aligns with the broader normalisation agenda. See Helen Flores, “Recto: Philippines nears upper middle-class country status”, Philippine Star, 1 March 2026.Hide Footnote Finally, if the process is still stuck by late June, the president may need to establish an office dedicated to putting the normalisation agenda in motion.For their part, the ex-rebels should understand that government budgets have limits, meaning that contributions from the BARMM are essential. The regional government should consider drawing from the Block Grant or the Special Development Fund to underwrite specific normalisation projects.
165
The MILF-led interim government has already allocated $6.85 million to normalisation.Hide Footnote It is also crucial for the interim government to calculate how much it has spent on normalisation since the transition started and who exactly the beneficiaries have been. To ensure more effective communication between Manila and the regional government with respect to funding decisions, the cluster mechanism on normalisation, a coordinating body created in 2019, should include more representatives from the autonomous region in its meetings and working groups as a matter of principle.The parties also need to break the decommissioning deadlock. The MILF is unlikely to turn in the entire list of combatants for the fourth and last phase of decommissioning, given how little it trusts Manila at present, but it could begin by submitting a partial list, with perhaps 2,000-2,500 names. For that to happen, however, Manila must demonstrate to the MILF that it is serious about delivering socio-economic packages to ex-combatants. It should earmark funds for direct cash assistance to the combatants on the list that the MILF hands over. In parallel, the peace process office, ideally with clear marching orders from the president, should lobby the relevant national agencies to make sure they allocate the necessary funds for the packages’ various components, such as health benefits, education and housing. 

Efforts to transform former MILF camps into peaceful civilian communities … must continue apace.

Efforts to transform former MILF camps into peaceful civilian communities – an undertaking that will necessarily stretch long beyond the parliamentary elections (see Section V.D below) – must continue apace. The national department of agrarian reform, along with the Joint Task Force on Camp Transformation, has begun documenting customary land claims to help untangle land tenure disputes in the camps, a major reason for the slow pace of normalisation to date.
166
The initial workshops are due to conclude in mid-February. The Camp Transformation Task Force should then take up the mantle. Crisis Group interview, consultant, 1 February 2026.Hide Footnote Furthermore, the government and the MILF, but also community-based conflict mediators, should be more proactive in resolving feuds in the six MILF camps.Other aspects of normalisation also deserve more attention. The persistence of private armies poses an immediate threat of violence in pockets of the Bangsamoro. Disbanding them will require resolute action on Manila’s part, but also cooperation from the MILF. Military and police units should accelerate intelligence-led operations to arrest key operatives, while national and regional authorities ought to impose penalties on local politicians who support these militias with money and guns. The government should also bolster transitional justice initiatives, passing the necessary legislation for a national commission and sponsoring intergenerational and intercultural dialogue, especially in selected areas where Muslims and non-Muslims live side by side.
167
For example, at the boundary of Cotabato province and the Special Geographic Area, the province of Lanao del Norte and the municipality of Wao in Lanao del Sur. Hide Footnote Measures such as these would foster greater social cohesion in conflict-affected areas where tensions still occasionally arise. The government could also roll out targeted livelihood projects in Moro districts that endured large-scale violence in the past.

D. Tackling Violence, Promoting Inclusion

Both parties should redouble efforts to address a range of other unresolved problems that risk generating friction.The most acute problem is violence. MILF and MNLF leaders need to take stronger disciplinary action against members involved in bloody disputes, in accordance with the organisations’ internal regulations. With guns proliferating in the Bangsamoro, the police and military also need to intervene as early as possible in rido clashes to prevent them from escalating.
168
There is precedent for such action: in late 2024, the military intervened more assertively to deter clashes in Maguindanao.Hide Footnote Furthermore, regional authorities need to dedicate more resources to resolving land disputes, which are a major driver of violence. As Crisis Group has previously suggested, the chief minister should push for creating a BARMM Inter-Agency Working Group on Land Administration and Management, allocating it adequate funding.
169
See Georgi Engelbrecht, “The clear and present danger of local violence in the Bangsamoro”, Mindanews, 11 December 2024.Hide Footnote This step would also complement the land-related work in the MILF camps, as conflicts over tenure are to be found across the region. The Bangsamoro would also benefit from a commission tasked with surveying land to prepare the way for tenure reform that would resolve competing claims and develop plans for land registration and titling.The peace process also must remain responsive to the needs of non-Moro minorities. It is essential that Manila ensure the safety of the Tëduray and Lambangian Indigenous peoples, as more violence against them could estrange them even further from the region’s authorities, prompting some of them to retaliate. Failure to address the issue would be a major setback for the interim government’s commitment to protect all the Bangsamoro’s people. In addition, the military should redeploy a number of troops, perhaps a few companies, from more peaceful parts of the Bangsamoro to the areas where these vulnerable communities live, particularly the mountains of Shariff Aguak, Datu Hoffer and Upi. The regional branch of the national police should step up patrols and work more closely with residents in order to deter attacks.For their part, regional authorities would do well to sharpen their focus on municipalities and villages where Indigenous groups form the majority, for example in Maguindanao and parts of Tawi-Tawi and Lanao del Sur. Neglecting socio-economic development in these areas could pave the way for further violence, as could failing to respect these groups’ customary systems of governance and conflict resolution. 

E. International Support

Donors to the Bangsamoro peace process have played a key role in its progress to date. They are no less critical at this stage, as ensuring durable peace in the region will require long-term support.
170
Crisis Group interviews, peacebuilding organisation staff, Manila, July 2025.Hide Footnote Yet though the peace process is among the few in the world that is still broadly succeeding, the risks of complacency or disenchantment among donors are growing.Patient engagement is crucial. Diplomats and development officials should systematically highlight the importance of the normalisation agenda when interacting with national agencies in Manila. They should pay regular visits to Cotabato City, Marawi City and Zamboanga, as well as to MILF camps – to monitor the development projects they fund but also to signal their continued commitment to the peace process. Beyond the generous investment they have made so far, most also have an interest in peace since a return to instability in Muslim Mindanao would again tie up the Philippine military at the expense of its pivot to external defence.
171
Crisis Group Report, Riding Unruly Waves, op. cit., pp. 8, 30.Hide Footnote Lack of coordination among donors has long been a problem, leading to gaps and overlaps in both programming and geographical coverage. A guiding principle could be for donors to streamline their support, with each focusing on a particular area, such as governance, health, livelihoods, peacebuilding or infrastructure. Donors should seek to adjust their engagement with the BARMM’s mid-level bureaucrats, providing them with continuous training sessions, instead of the one-off “capacity building” projects that are common in the Bangsamoro but have achieved little. Donors should also make funds more easily available to use for stopgap measures in times of crisis, such as sudden large-scale displacement due to an outbreak of conflict or a natural disaster.

Life in Marawi City has mostly returned to normal. But tens of thousands of persons remain displaced after the deadly 2017 conflict. February 2026.
CRISIS GROUP / Georgi Engelbrecht

VI. Conclusion

The formal transition from the Bangsamoro interim government to an elected regional parliament will mark a milestone in bringing the 2014 peace deal to fruition. But while the Bangsamoro peace process is one of the few worldwide that has not crumbled, an uncertain political trajectory and delays have led to an impasse between the Philippine government and the MILF. The slow pace of disarming ex-combatants and carrying out development projects is undermining hard-won progress, underscoring that peace in the region cannot be taken for granted.Hopes for the future depend on realising the provisions of the peace agreement but just as much on the everyday efforts of the interim and national governments to build a stronger understanding of the way forward, avoid political rifts, reduce levels of violence and improve the region’s economic prospects. The Marcos administration has less than three years left in its term to get the peace process back on track and consolidate its gains. For now, the odds favour an uneasy, imperfect peace over a return to war. But absent urgent action to steady the course, the tenuous calm in the Bangsamoro risks giving way to renewed instability.Manila/Brussels, 10 March 2026

Appendix A: Map of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)

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Vance and Hegseth attend dignified transfer ceremony – as it happened

This liveblog is closed. Follow the latest on our new liveblog here.Donald Trump has said a decision on when to end the war with Iran will be a “mutual” one he’ll make together with Benjamin Netanyahu, the Times of Israel has reported.It said Trump also claimed in a brief telephone interview on Sunday that Iran would have destroyed Israel if he and Netanyahu had not been around. The US president said:Iran was going to destroy Israel and everything else around it … We’ve worked together. We’ve destroyed a country that wanted to destroy Israel.I think it’s mutual … a little bit. We’ve been talking. I’ll make a decision at the right time, but everything’s going to be taken into account. Continue reading…